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Can TEAM Work? Implications of an Electromation and




Congress is now considering a controversial bill (the "TEAM Act"') to
loosen the National Labor Relations Act's2 ("NLRA") restrictions on work
teams, commonly called employee involvement groups. Employers believe
a 1992 National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") decision, Electroma-
tion,3 seriously undermines the legality of these teams.4 The ruling has
widespread significance since these teams exist in more than 30,000
workplaces. 5
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a victim of the Holocaust who died as a human shield for retreating Nazi troops.
1 S. 295, 104th Cong., lstSess. (1995); H.R. 743, 104th Cong., lstSess. (1995) (both bills are
commonly referred to as "The Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995"). For an
overview of the TEAM Act, see infra notes 117-41.
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1988).
3 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
4 The president of the Whirlpool Corporation's testimony before the Commission on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations (also called the "Dunlop Commission"), summarized
the employer's perspective as follows:
I see excellent employee-management relations at Whirlpool because of our cooperation
and participation. But a threat does exist to the continued improvement and success at
Whirlpool and throughout the United States. The threat is found in the NLRB's recent
rulings in the cases of Electromation and DuPont under section 8(a) (2) of the Labor
Act.
I have no intentions of debating the fine points of what constitutes a 'labor organi-
zation' or 'domination' under the law; however, as a business leader operating in a
challenging global environment, I know that any ruling that compromises our ability to
involve our people.., to empower our workers ... to commit to our employees.., puts
every American job in peril.
Selected Statements before Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee on Teamwork for Employees and
Managers Act (S. 295), Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at E-1 to E-2 (Feb. 10, 1995).
5 See Rep. Gunderson Plans to Introduce Bill to Address Effects fElectromation Ruling, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 245, at A-16 (Dec. 21, 1992) (citing this general figure). Employer reaction is
reported in Albert R. Karr, Labor Letter WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1992, at Al (citing employer alarm
over the decision and a dire prediction that the decision would unleash a flood of union-inspired
lawsuits against employee involvement programs). A leading employer group, the Labor Policy
Association, said "workplace cooperation was pushed on thin ice today as a result of (Electroma-
tion)," and derided the Board's ruling as "totally unresponsive to modern workplace realities."
Id.; see also Arnold E. PerI, Employee Involvement Groups: The Outcry over the NLRB's Electromation
Decisi 44 LAB. LJ. 195 (1993).
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Further, employers view these teams as an essential ingredient to their
success because they remove layers of costly and unnecessary managers,
6
motivate employees by giving them more control over work,7 and improve
their competitiveness. 8 Moreover, these teams appear to be part of a long-
term employer strategy to reduce core, permanent employment by as-
signing more project-driven work to specially created teams.9
But unions see something sinister in these work teams and the TEAM
Act: a return to 1930s company unions, sham organizations mounted by
employers to frustrate union organizing. 0
6 Robert M. Tomasko, Restructuring: Getting It Right, MGmT. REv., Apr. 1992, at 10 (reporting
management guru Peter Drucker's reflections that "[m]iddle managers have become insecure,
and they feel unbelievably hurt. They feel like slaves on the auction block.").
7 Innumerable articles and books document this phenomenon. For informative and recent
accounts, see Barbara Ettorre, GE Brings A New Washer To Life, MGMT. REv., Sept. 1995, at 33
(describing how a union representing 8,000 employees and a hard-nosed employer used worker
empowerment principles to recreate a work culture, from the engineers to production workers,
and saved a large business in Louisville, Kentucky); Susan Harte, UPS To Let Rank-and-File Workers
Buy Stock; Move Part of Firm's Effort To Increase Employee Involvement, ATL. CONST., Aug. 29, 1995, at
F1 (reporting on a new pay plan to complement a change in work culture permitting UPS drivers
to manage their work).
A detailed examination of a typical employee involvement effort appears in Raju Narisetti,
Manufacturers Decry A Shortage of Workers While Rejecting Many, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1995, at Al. The
article describes that Scott Paper Co. recently built a new plant in Owensboro, Kentucky, staffing
it with half the usual number of employees. Every employee is assigned multiple production re-
sponsibilities within teams. The account relates that:
Along with operating the tissue-making equipment, the Owensboro workers do tasks
previously handled by managers. They develop their own five week production sched-
ules, enter data in computer spreadsheets, buy supplies and load onto 18-wheelers cases
of two-ply bathroom tissue rolls coming off packing machines. They deal with custom-
ers and production staff at other Scott mills. They even take attendance, interview job
seekers, and vote on merit raises for one another.
Id. at A4.
8 See, e.g., Northern Telecom Employees Say Team Style Aids Plant, Workers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 106, at C-1 (June 1, 1990) (describing a now common type practice of re-engineering work-
places into "cells" that monitor and improve manufacturing efficiency, conduct performance re-
views, adopt flexible work schedules, and interview team applicants). The article explains how
managers and employees perceive this organizational change as essential to competing withJapa-
nese counterparts. This perception was summarized by operations manager Anna Versteeg:
In the 1980s, American business went to robotics, automation, and all of the hard, tech-
nological improvement. One of the things I think we forgot was what made us impor-
tant, and that was the people and the innovation and the gains that you can get from
turning on the people. That is what made us great in the Fifties and Sixties and led us
when we were ahead of the Japanese.
Id.
9 See Michael Verespej, A Workforce Revolution?, INDUSTRY WiL, Aug. 21, 1995, at 21 (predict-
ing that core jobs will continue to shrink in numbers, supplanted by teams of contingent workers
coming together for particular projects).
10 As Congress began hearings on the TEAM Act, the president of the United Steelworkers of
America, George Becker, stated that the bill "turns back the labor law clock 60 years, suggesting
that the boss can decide who speaks for workers on workplace committees." Philip Dine, Neither
Labor Nor Management Raves Over New Workplace Report, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 13, 1995, at
1G. Shortly thereafter, the president of the Teamsters union blasted the TEAM Act as:
undemocratic and un-American. All Americans should have the right to choose their
own representatives. No one would call it democracy if people from another country
chose America's leaders. In the same way, it is undemocratic to let management choose
employee representatives, dictate what issues they can discuss, and disband a committee
if it takes the wrong positions.
GOP Lawmakers Propose Lifting Ban on Company-Sponsored Labor Committees, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 20, at A-1 (Jan. 31, 1995).
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Recent law review articles on employee involvement teams debate
whether the NLRA should be amended to remove legal impediments af-
fecting these teams." Meanwhile, numerous social science studies have ex-
amined work teams to discover their organizational and business effects, 12
as well as effects on workers.' 3 In addition, there have been many U.S. gov-
ernment reports on these teams.'
4
As hearings on the TEAM Act were occurring, the main federation of U.S. labor unions, the
AFL-CIO, issued a statement asserting that the "TEAM Act has nothing to do with teamwork....
Indeed, even in workplaces in which employees have democratically elected a union to be their
exclusive representative, the so-called TEAM Act would allow employers to create, fund, and deal
with a rival, company-controlled union." Federation Announces Campaign on Worker Concerns About
Jobs, Wages, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at A-3 (Feb. 23, 1995).
11 For books and articles sympathetic to this reform, see WILLIAM B. GOULD, IV, AGENDA FOR
LABOR LAw REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS & THE LAw 121 (1993); Michael S.
Albright, The Legality of Employee Participation Programs Following the NLRB's Electromation, Inc.
Decision, 1993 DEr. C.L. REv. 1035; Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company
Union"Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125
(1994) (contending that section 8 (a) (2) currently reduces the ability of employers to expand
employee roles and capabilities); Michael H. LeRoy, Employer Domination of Labor Organizations
and the Electromation Case: An Empirical Public Policy Analysis, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1812 (1993)
(reporting that about 70% of 282 surveyed unions rated as satisfactory their participation in coop-
erative or employee involvement programs); Robert B. Moberly, The Worker Participation Conun-
drum: Does ProhibitingEmployer-Assisted Labor Organizations Prevent Labor-Management Cooperation ?, 69
WASH. L. REV. 831 (1994); Martin T. Moe, Participatory Workplace Decisionmakzng and the NLRA:
Section 8(a)(2), Electromation, and the Specter of the Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1127 (1993);
Joseph B. Ryan, The Encouragement of Labor-Management Cooperation: Improving American Productivity
through Revision of the National Labor Relations Act, 40 UCLAL. REV. 571 (1992); Paul Weiler & Guy
Mundlak, New Directions for the Law of the Workplace 102 YALE LJ. 1907 (1993) (maintaining that
employers should be permitted more latitude to experiment with employee participation if they
meet certain standards); Shaun G. Clarke, Note, Rethinking the Adversarial Model in Labor Relations:
An Argument for Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 YALE LJ. 2021 (1987).
For the case against loosening sections 2(5) and 8(a) (2), see A.B. Cochran, III, We Participate,
They Decide: The Real Stakes in Revising Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations AC, 16 BERKELEY
J. ON EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 458 (1995); Steven I. Locke, Note, Keeping Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of
the NLRA Intact: A Fresh Look at Worker Participation Committees Through Electromation, Inc., 10
HoFsTRA LAB. LJ. 375 (1992); Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument
Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1662
(1983).
12 See, e.g., William Cooke, Product Quality Improvement Through Employee Participation: The Ef-
fects of Unionization and Joint Union-Management Administration, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 119
(1992); Harry C. Katz et al., Industrial Relations and Productivity in the U.S. Automobile Industry, in 3
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ATIVITY 685 (1987); Harry C. Katz et al., Assessing the Effects of
Industrial Relations and Quality of Working Life on Organizational Effectiveness, 28 AcAD. MGMT. J. 509
(1985); Harry C. Katz et al., Industrial Relations Performance, Economic Performance, and QWL Pro-
grams: An Interplant Analysis, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL REv. 3 (1983).
13 See, e.g., Carrie R. Leana & Edward Locke, Participation in Decision Making: One More Look, in
1 RESEARCH & ORCANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 265 (B. Staw ed., 1979);John A. Wagner, III & Richard
Z. Gooding, Shared Influence and Organizational Behavior: A Meta-Analysis of Situational Variables
Expected to Moderate Participation-Outcome Relationships, 30 AcaD. OF MGMT. J. 524 (1987); John A.
Wagner, III & Richard Z. Gooding, Effects of Societal Trends on Participation Research, 32 ADMIN. SC.
Q. 241 (1987).
14 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HIGH PERFORMANCE WORK PRAcTIcEs AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
(1993); BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, THE NEW WORK SYSTEM NETwoRK: A COMPENDIUM OF WORK INNOVATION CASES (1990);
BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
COOPERATIVE PARTNERSHIP: A NEW BEGINNING FOR NATIONAL STEEL AND THE UNITED STEELWVORK-
ERS OF AMERICA (1989); BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE CHANGING ROLE OF FIRs-r-LINE SUPERVISORS AND MIDDLE MANAGERS
(1988); BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, FORGING PARTNERSHIP THROUGH EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT- THE CASE OF THE GM-HYDRA-
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This Article examines the TEAM Act from a perspective that is familiar
to lawyers and social scientists, and also employers and unions. It grows
from a detailed survey that was based on employer compliance guidelines
discussed in Electromation and a closely related decision in a union-repre-
sented workplace, DuPont.15 Twenty-three of these surveys were completed
in late 1994 and early 1995 for teams in non-union workplaces located
across the nation.
As a result, this Article appears to report the first survey of employer
compliance with Electromation and DuPont precepts.' 6 Although the survey
here is very small, it suggests preliminary conclusions about some of the
public policy arguments Congress is considering. One of this Article's most
important conclusions is that the work teams surveyed here were very dif-
ferent from company unions in the 1930s. Those organizations tended to
be large monoliths with a centralized management structure that pre-
tended to negotiate better pay and working conditions for workers; in con-
trast, most of the surveyed teams here were small, semi-autonomous or
autonomous units that dealt more narrowly with work efficiency or product
quality issues. A second key finding is that three-fourths of the teams ap-
pear to comply with Electromation and DuPont. The others, in varying de-
grees, seemed to have one or more features that conflicted with the
guidance principles stated in Electromation or DuPont. Even in these cases,
however, there was no evidence to suggest that these teams were anything
like company unions in the 1930s.
B. Organization of this Article
Section II examines how changes in industrial production prior to en-
actment of the NLRA were organized around a hierarchical and authority-
centered management structure. It recounts how this control structure led
employers in the 1930s to respond to intensive union organizing by creat-
ing illusory representational organizations called company unions. This dis-
cussion also attempts to explain why unions perceive current work teams as
reappearing forms of company unions. This explanation focuses on the
declining nature of the American labor movement, and unions' under-
standable perception that a philosophy embraced by so many employers
cannot be trusted.
Section III examines the origins of the NLRA's prohibition against
these sham unions. The NLRA was premised on a fundamental assumption
that workers and employers had conflicting interests in the workplace;
Congress identified company unions as a prime manifestation of employer
attempts to subvert workers' free choice of a union to represent their em-
ployment interests. Passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933
MATIC WILLOW RUN PLANT AND UAW 735 JOINT ACTIVITIES (1988); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, QUALITY
OF WORK LIFE: AT&T AND CWA EXAMINE PROcEss AFTER THREE YEARS (1985).
15 Dupont, 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
16 Sandra L. Nunn, Comment, Are American Businesses Operating Within the Law? The Legality of
Employee Action Committees and Other Employee Participation Plans, 63 U. CIN. L. RPv. 1379, 1431-32
(1995) (engaging in the kind of analysis presented here, but rather than surveying actual work-
places with these programs, answers the compliance question by examining the general charac-
teristics of QWL, Quality Circle, survey feedback, and other employee representation plans).
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fostered company unions by encouraging collective bargaining between
employers and unions. Many employers correctly anticipated that this law
presaged a stronger obligation to recognize independent unions, and con-
sequently, engaged in preemptive organizing of their own workforce to
keep real unions out. Thus, Congress enacted a sweeping ban against com-
pany unions, first by defining in section 2(5) a labor organization broadly
to include all forms of employee groups that deal with employers over a
wide range of employment matters, and second, by prohibiting employers
in section 8(a) (2) from dominating or interfering with such organizations.
As evidence in this Article shows, employers do not use work teams today as
company unions, because teams concern themselves with much more lim-
ited matters, principally work process or efficiency, and product or service
quality.
Section IV examines the Board's Electromation and DuPont decisions in
detail. Specifically, this discussion focuses on guidance principles that the
Board announced to help employers and unions discern when workplace
teams, now commonplace, run afoul of the NLRA. This discussion is im-
portant because the survey used in this study incorporated these compli-
ance principles.
Many employers reacted to Electromation with vehement opposition or
great concern. Although Republicans did not control the 103rd Congress,
the first version of the TEAM Act was introduced in 1993 shortly after the
Board decided Electromation. This Act is discussed in Section V, as is the
current version of the TEAM Act. The main conclusion of this section is
that the TEAM Act does not portend a return to company unions, as most
unions and some scholars suggest. To the contrary, a close reading of the
bill shows that it codifies the essential guidance principles that the Board
stated in Electromation and DuPont. Therefore, to the extent that employer
compliance with these decisions can be measured, one can reasonably pre-
dict how employers would behave if the bill were enacted. This Article con-
cludes that nothing in the TEAM Act would induce employers to
fundamentally change their current use of work teams.
Section VI describes how survey questions were developed, how the
sample was drawn, and flaws in these research methods. It also reports
seven main findings: (1) most teams were small; (2) almost half the teams
only made suggestions to management, and therefore, did not even meet
the threshold requirement of "dealing with" an employer to constitute a
section 2(5) labor organization; (3) most teams handled work process or
product quality issues, in apparent conformity to guidelines set forth in
Electromation and DuPont;, (4) two-thirds of the teams were created by man-
agement; (5) recruitment of team members was equally divided between
volunteer and employer selection; (6) most teams acted on the basis of
employee-management consensus; and (7) the most common form of team
evaluation was performed by employees and managers.
Based on these findings, Section VII discusses what these characteris-
tics of work teams imply for such organizations if the TEAM Act becomes
law. The main implication is that the TEAM Act will change little or noth-
ing about the administration of these work teams. Since unions viewed Elec-
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tromation and DuPont favorably, and never suggested that these decisions
portend a return to company unions, and since the Act does nothing more
than codify the main guidance principles in these cases, most of the team
activity observed here-which appeared to be legal-should be expected
to continue without change.
Beyond these immediate implications are some broader issues posed
by the TEAM Act: will employers stay the course with work teams, or is this
a passing fad? Also, will the TEAM Act frustrate union organizing? Section
VIII notes that employers' present infatuation with teams is nothing new.
Some employers used similar organizations in the 1920s, but for some inex-
plicable reason, withdrew from this social experimentation. This historical
fact is relevant to the TEAM Act, because in the long-term, no one can be
sure that the organizational form that employers are seeking to protect will
be used.
The rest of the section presents several empirical arguments that tend
to refute critics of the TEAM Act, who claim that its provisions would de-
press union organizing activity. Although progressive in concept, work
teams are occasionally accompanied by restructuring that includes layoffs,
and therefore, are sometimes perceived by employees as a new way for em-
ployers to get more work for the same pay. Even in the absence of layoffs,
some evidence shows that the Japanese concept of Kaizen (continuous im-
provement) is at the heart of work teams; but in reality, unrelenting at-
tempts to improve productivity can lead to employee burnout. In sum,
team work has some virtues, but also some distinct problems; and these
problems have the potential to feed union organizing in the future. Thus,
the doom-and-gloom picture painted by the TEAM Act's critics is probably
overstated, as is the uncritically positive account of work teams offered by
TEAM Act supporters.
II. THE WORKER-EMPLOYER CONFLICT MODEL EMBODIED IN THE NLRA
A. The National Labor Relations Act and the Industrial Revolution
Enacted in 1935, the NLRA stands at the midpoint of two very differ-
ent periods of workplace organization. By the end of the Nineteenth cen-
tury, automated production overtook manual work, and this profoundly
changed the organization of work in factories. A contemporaneous ac-
count by Sidney and Beatrice Webb explains this transformation in the
bootmaking industry:
[N] ew machines have introduced a new organisation of the factory, the
workman steadily becoming less and less of an individual producer, work-
ing at his own speed, and more and more a member of a 'team,' or a
small part of the operatives each performing a small part of the process,
and thus obliged to keep up with each other.
17
Furthermore, there existed an employer ideology that owners of capi-
tal were intrinsically superior to common laborers. The Reverend Henry
Ward Beecher boiled this view down to, "God intended the great to be
17 SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 399 (14th ed. 1920).
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great and the little to be little,"'18 while Abram Hewitt intoned: "It is for the
master [employer] to do the thinking."19 A Chicago bank pamphlet from
the 1860s translated this philosophy into a social contract for the work-
place: "When workmen accept such employment... they must be under-
stood as surrendering their individual freedom to the extent which is
necessary for enabling him to fulfill the responsibility of his position."
20
In short, innovations in manufacturing technology in the second-half
of the Nineteenth century, combined with a Darwinistic employer ideology,
offered an ideal culture for the development of a hierarchical, authority-
centered personnel management structure.
By the 1890s, employers began to recognize that scientific manage-
ment of human resources was no less vital to their success than technologi-
cal improvements in their factories, and they developed bureaucracies "to
subdivide, as well as to coordinate, the tasks of administration and produc-
tion . . . to maximize the efficiency of each operation. ' 21 Human beings
were viewed as machines whose performance could be improved with
sound engineering.22 Their performance was to be orchestrated in a hier-
archical system in which all jobs were carefully analyzed, and then coordi-
nated by management.23  Contrary to current themes of worker
involvement and empowerment, this workplace ideology was often explic-
itly premised on managerial elitism:
[T]he number of people of relatively low intelligence is vastly greater
than is generally appreciated and... this mass of low-level intelligence is
an enormous menace to democracy unless it is recognized and properly
treated.... [T] he intelligent group must do the planning and organiz-
ing for the mass .... our whole attitude toward lower grades of intelli-
gence must be based upon an intelligent understanding of the mental
capacity of each individual.24
18 DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY 230-31 (1967).
19 Id. at 231.
20 Id.
21 Reinhard Bendix, Bureaucratization in Industry, in INDUSTRIAL CONFUCT 164, 170 (Arthur
Kornhauser et al. eds., 1954).
22 The preeminent labor economist of this period summarized this conception as follows:
Now comes the scientific engineer.... [H]e is hired by the employer to advise him how
to get the greatest output at the least cost. The engineer studies how to economize the
forces of... human nature embodied in men.... The stop-watch, the special slide rule,
the speedometer, the time-testing laboratory, have the same use applied to both. The
"fatigue curve" is unfeelingly figured out so as to show the speed at which each human
machine should run in order to insure its longest life and greatest efficiency.
JOHN R. COMMONS, LABOR AND ADMINISTRATION 141-42 (1913).
23 For a summary of this conception, see PJ. Nilsen,Job Analysis, Proceedings of the Employ-
ment Managers' Conference (May 9-11, 1918), in BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1919, at 132:
Whenever I think ofjob analysis I am reminded of the expression 'square pegs in round
holes.' ... Of course, the holes referred to are the different positions that go to make an
organization. If the organization is represented by a chart, these holes might be repre-
sented by circles or rectangles of various dimensions depending on the importance of
the position. The pegs, then, are the incumbents of these positions, or the persons all
the way down the line from president to messenger boy, who fill, or try to fill, these
holes. Now the number and kind of positions, or holes if you please, are authorized and
provided by the management in a more or less formal and definite way.
24 Henry H. Goddard, The Levels of Inteligence, in PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR BUSINESS EXECU-
TwES 48 (Lionel Edie ed., 1922).
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This marriage of machine production and hierarchical management
created not only extreme specialization ofjobs, but engendered such "stan-
dardized procedures . . .that the incumbent has little chance to do [the
work] his own way. He has been left with a minimum of decisions about the
work itself."25 One woman's experience as a coil winder at a large Westing-
house factory in East Pittsburgh typified this experience: "It was such a mo-
notonous job! Oh, just repetitive! You would do it all automatically. You
didn't have to use your head at all. It gave us a lot of time to think about
other things.
'26
Although more employers were guided in their management of work-
ers by this control philosophy, there were notable exceptions to this trend.
The Filene Cooperative, founded in 1898 by a progressive management,
gave workers the right to govern their working conditions, subject to the
owners' right to veto.27 Owner Edward Filene believed that:
industrial democracy, under which employees will have an adequate voice
in the policies of the industry and an adequate stake in the profits of an
industry, is inevitable.... because we have given to the masses of employ-
ees a political vote with which they can get anything and everything they
find themselves unable to get by industrial methods.
28
By 1901, Filene's Association had an arbitration board, consisting of em-
ployee representatives, who settled grievances over wages, discharge, and
working conditions.
29
This example was far from unique. A leading industrial consultant,
John Leitsch, adapted the U.S. Constitution to provide a labor-manage-
ment governance structure at Packard Piano Co.30 Also, the Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Co. and the Milwaukee Electric Railway were run under a
joint committee system of elected workers and superintendents.
31
In addition, even among some of the intellectual founders of scientific
personnel management, there was a sense that workplace applications were
untrue to their principles. Ironically, the leading light of this philosophy,
Frederick W. Taylor, bristled at employers' misuse of his ideas.3 2 In doing
25 Daniel Katz, Satisfactions and Deprivations in Industrial Life, in INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 86, 90
(Arthur Korhauser et al. eds., 1954).
26 RONALD W. ScHATz, THE ELECTRICAL WORKERS 32 (1983) (reported comments of Margaret
Darin Stasik).
27 MARY LADAME, THE FILENE STORE: A STUDY OF EMPLOYEES' RELATION TO MANAGEMENT IN A
RETAIL STORE (1930).
28 EDWARD A. FILENE, THE WAY OUT 170 (1925).
29 Id. at 142.
30 JOHN LErrCH, MAN TO MAN, THE STORY OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 30-62 (1919). His plan
created a workers' "House of Representatives" and a managers' "Senate," with the "presidency"
occupied by a team of senior executives. A rule became law when it passed both legislative assem-
blies and was approved the by the executives. Id. at 139-49.
31 U.S. COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 3 FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY 2734-35
(1916).
32 Scientific management is not any efficiency device ...not a system of figuring
costs.., not a piecework system... not a bonus system ... not a premium system... it
is not a stop watch on a man and writing things down about him ... it is not time-study,
it is not motion study ... it is not any of the devices which the average man calls to mind
when scientific management is spoken of.
FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 26 (1947).
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so, he stated a conception that sounds quite similar to the cooperation
themes espoused by employers today:
[I] n its essence scientific management involves a complete mental revolu-
don on the part of the workingman .... And it involves an equally
complete mental revolution on the part of those on the management
side.
... The great mental revolution that takes place in the mental atti-
tude of the two parties under scientific management is that both sides
take their eyes off of the division of the surplus as the all-important mat-
ter, and together turn their attention toward increasing the size of the
surplus until this surplus becomes so large ... that there is ample room
for a large increase in wages for the workmen and an equally great in-
crease in profits for the manufacturer.33
Elton Mayo, another personnel management luminary, also departed from
an orthodox view of control management. His industrial experiments led
to the conclusion that teamwork boosted worker productivity more than
scientific factors, such as timing and duration of rest periods and increas-
ing piece rates.34 This research is more consistent with current employee
involvement principles. In sum, although control-style management
predominated from the turn of the century until after the NLRA was en-
acted, there were numerous precursors to current conceptions of participa-
tive management that had nothing to do with company unions.
B. The National Labor Relations Act in the Post-Industrial Age
Sixty years after passage of the NLRA, control models have been re-
placed by empowerment models. 35 These models emphasize different val-
ues. Generally, they assume that organizational performance improves
33 Id. at 27, 29-30.
34 See ELTON MAYO, THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL CmIiZATION 72-73 (1945), report-
ing on research involving six women who made telephone assemblies:
[T]he major experimental change was introduced when those in charge sought to hold
the situation humanly steady by getting the cooperation of the workers. What actually
happened was that six individuals became a team and the team gave itself wholeheart-
edly and spontaneously to cooperation in the experiment. The consequence was that
they felt themselves to be participating, freely and without afterthought, and were happy
in the knowledge that they were working without coercion from above or limitation
below.
35 For an excellent summary of this new organizational paradigm, see Richard Seaman, How
Self-Directed Work Teams Support Strategic Alignment COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS REv.,July 17, 1995,
at 23:
More and more companies are realizing that a new organizational structure, within the
command-and-control paradigm, delivers no organizational benefit because it does not
strike to the heart of the problem. Self directed work teams and management delayering
often come into play because of the time dimension of competition and the aforemen-
tioned decision-making process. Strategic alignment frequently demands a more re-
sponsive organizational structure, one that permits people closer to the product or
service to make the decisions that keep the customer happy.
Id. at 27; see also RahulJacob, The Struggle To Create An Organization for the 21st Century, FORTUNE,
Apr. 3, 1995, at 90, offering this insightful report of how firms are reengineering work:
The horizontal corporation includes these potent elements: Teams will provide the
foundation of organizational design. They will not be set up inside departments, like
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when hierarchy is reduced and delayering disperses power to workers;36
that workers add value to the work process as a result of accumulated job
experience and self-improvement;3 7 that workers need less direct manage-
rial supervision, 38 while technology disperses information and thereby nar-
rows the knowledge-gap between workers and managers;39 that worker
interests are aligned more closely with customer satisfaction and team per-
formance;40 and that employee evaluation is most effective when done by a
combination of co-workers and supervisors.
4'
A product of the control-management period, the NLRA stands at the
threshold of a new century, but has been largely unchanged since 1947.42
Moreover, the Act's most basic element-conferring the right upon em-
ployees to form their own organizations to negotiate terms and conditions
of employment with employers, without interference by employers43-has
remained constant since 1935. In consequence, a heated debate in the
104th Congress has pitted employers who have forsaken their control mod-
els for worker empowerment against labor unions, who increasingly per-
marketing, but around core processes, such as new-product development. Process own-
ers, not department heads, will be the top managers ....
Id.
36 For current examples, see Perry Flint, The Buck Stops Lower, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Sept. 1,
1995, at 28 (reporting on United Air Lines efforts to restructure work by replacing vertical hierar-
chies with more horizontal work-structures); David Nissan, The Great HQ Breakup, FIN. POST, Aug.
15, 1995, at 49 (reporting on organizational decentralization at Monsanto, Hoescht AG, and
Royal Bank of Canada).
37 See Raymond E. Miles & Charles C. Snow, The New Network Firm: A Spherical Structure Built
On A Human Investment Philosophy, 23 ORGANzATIONAL DYNAmics 4, 13 (1995) (stating that the
"human investment philosophy focuses on current abilities but places special emphasis on the
potential of organization members to develop a potential package of technical, business, and self-
management skills to possess the capability to grow new competencies to meet tomorrow's
needs.").
38 See id. at 4, 11 (reporting that Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), an electronics manufacturer that
uses employee teams "has minimized the amount of rule-guided behavior among its internal
units, substituting instead a series of market-oriented processes and rewards that encourage coop-
erative and mutually beneficial actions.").
39 See Gerald E. Ledford, Jr., Designing Nimble Reward Systems, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV.,
July 17, 1995, at 46-47 (noting that "[i]nformation technology allows companies to respond to
change in market demand almost instantly. It also permits the use of new organizational forms,
such as flattened hierarchy, which becomes possible as technology replaces middle
management.").
40 SeeJohn A. Byrne, The Horizontal Corporation, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 20, 1993, at 76, reporting an
ideal that more employers are approaching-
Self-managing teams would become the building blocks of the new organization. Per-
formance objectives would be linked to customer satisfaction rather than profitability or
shareholder values. And staffers would be rewarded not just for individual performance
but also for the development of their skills and for team performance.
Id. at 77.
41 See Manuel London & Richard W. Beatty, 360-Degree Feedback as a Competitive Advantage, 32
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 353 (1993).
42 In 1947, The Taft-Hartley Act substantially amended the NLRA. These reforms favored
employers, inter alia, by creating unfair labor practices for unions, including broad prohibitions
on secondary strikes, requiring that a notice period precede a strike, and recognizing employer
speech rights. For specific provisions, see the H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.S.CAN. 1135, that eventually became law over President Truman's
veto.
43 "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
. ... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
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ceive this as a superficial transformation aimed at installing the very kind of
company union that the NLRA prohibited.
C. The Decline and Insecurity of American Labor Unions in the 1990s
For unions, the parallels between 1935 and 1995 are alarming. This
perspective is important to understand because it helps to explain why un-
ions are so vigorously opposed to the TEAM Act. Contrary to the view ex-
pressed by some labor law and industrial relations experts, this Article sees
few similarities between current participative programs and sham unions
from the 1930s. But the TEAM Act arises in a context of long-term union
decline, and this context is important in explaining why labor's reaction to
the TEAM Act is overblown and unfounded.
In the private sector, union representation of workers has been in
such long-term decline that membership gains made over the past four
decades have been erased.44 Labor's declining political influence45
reached a modem-day low point when Republicans were restored to power
in both the House and Senate in the 1994 national elections. This election
underscored labor's political impotence, and this alone helps to explain
why the AFL-CIO opposes the TEAM Act. Even if benign, the legislation
symbolizes that unions no longer have a hand on the labor-policy rudder.
Unions' dreadful experiences since 1980 in organizing new members,
and in bargaining new contracts, also factor in labor's attack on the TEAM
Act. Unions' ability to strike has been crippled,46 and because more em-
ployers appear to be hiring permanent replacements when unions strike,
unions have lost their former ability to mount credible threats to strike.47
44 In 1994, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (the "BI.S") found that 16.7 million workers, or
15.5% of the workforce, belong to unions. Union Membership: Data For 1994 Shows Membership Held
Steady At 16.7 Million, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at D-23 (Feb. 9, 1995). The BLS survey
found a continuation in declining union membership totals in the private sector, dating back to
the 1950s. In 1994, 9.6 million of these workers, or 10.9% of the private sector workforce, were
union members. For historical perspective on this decline, see Lisa Williamson, Union Mergers:
1985-94 Update, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Feb. 1, 1995, at 18, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53,
at D-26 (Feb. 1995) (offering this summary: "Union membership declined by nearly 4.4 million
between 1979 (when union membership reached its peak) and 1994. The decrease was wide-
spread in the private sector, particularly in the primary metals, automobile and aerospace equip-
ment manufacturing, transportation, and communications industries....").
45 See generallyJohn T. Delaney & Marick F. Masters, Unions in PoliticalAction, in THE STATE OF
THE UNIONS 313 (George Strauss etal. eds., 1991);John T. Delaney & Susan Schwochau, Employee
Representation Through the Political Process, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE
DiRECIONS 265, 302 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) (predicting that "move-
ment away from organized labor as workers' political representatives will lead to the creation of
another interest group to take the place of the AFL-CIO in political arenas.").
46 See BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, VOL 45, No. 12, COMPENSATION &
WORING CONDITIONS 66 (1993) (Table D-1, Work Stoppages Involving 1,000 Workers or More,
1947-1993) (showing that there were 187 major strikes (involving 1,000 or more workers) in 1980,
145 in 1981, 96 in 1982, 81 in 1983, 62 in 1984, 54 in 1985, 69 in 1986, 46 in 1987, 40 in 1988, 51
in 1989, 44 in 1990, 40 in 1991, 35 in 1992, and 34 in 1993).
47 See generally Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U.
ILL. L. REv. 547; Michael H. LeRoy, RegulatingEmployer Use of Permanent Striker Replacements: Empir-
ical Analysis of NLRA and RLA Strikes, 1935-1991, 16 BEREELEYJ. OF EMPL. & LAB. L. 169 (1995);
Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Tune It Out 25 U.S.F. L. REv. 295 (1991); Note, One Strike
and You're Out? Creating An Efficient Permanent Replacement Doctrine, 106 HARv. L. RE%. 669 (1993).
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During this period, unions have found themselves with little choice but to
agree to contract concessions.
4 8
Compounding matters, labor came tantalizingly close in 1992, 4 9 and
then in 1994,50 in passing legislation it dearly wanted as a palliative to its
long, uninterrupted slide when Congress failed to enact striker replace-
ment legislation. Furthermore, unions suffered a humiliating defeat when
the presidential candidate they endorsed in 1992 deserted them in a cru-
cial trade agreement, NAFTA.5 1 Having passed only two minor employ-
ment laws in recent years-the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act 52 and the Family and Medical Leave Act 53-and having
failed to influence Congress to enact labor law reforms, labor's declining
ability to elect congressional candidates sympathetic to their movement has
been translated into legislative outcomes.
This Article offers no explanation for the fact that certain labor law
and industrial relations experts have erroneously concluded that passage of
the TEAM Act will return company unions to the workplace. Unions have
made the same assertion, and although their view is just as erroneous, it is
explainable in terms of the foregoing context. The rout of unions by em-
ployers in the organizing field, at the bargaining table, and at the general
election ballot box has been so thorough that unions cannot be blamed for
exaggerating the threat they imagine the TEAM Act presents.
48 See, e.g., Prohibiting Discrimination Against Economic Strikers: Hearing on S. 55 Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1991)
(statement of Karen Behnke, a replaced striker) ("During the negotiations Curtis Industries re-
peatedly threatened that if the UAW did not accept these concessions the company would perma-
nently replace all of the workers. To back up this threat the company ran newspaper
advertisements and began takingjob applications for replacement workers prior to the expiration
of the contract.").
49 The Workplace Fairness Act, a bill strongly backed by labor that would treat employer
hiring of permanent striker replacements as a new unfair labor practice, was defeated by a 57-42
cloture vote. See Senate Vote Kills Bill to Restrict Use of Permanent Striker Replacements, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 117, atA-9 (June 17, 1992).
50 This same legislation failed again in July 1994. See Senate Vote to End Filibuster on Striker
Replacement Fails 53-47, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 132, at AA-1 (July 13, 1994); Defeat of Striker
Replacement Bill A Victory for Business Coalition, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 133, at AA-1 (July 14,
1994).
51 James Gerstenzang, NAFTA Takes Toll in Anger, Split Allies Politics, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1993,
at 16 (reporting on labor's resounding defeat in trying to stop passage of NAFTA, and President
Clinton's aggressive support for the trade agreement).
52 See Plant Closing Bill Passes in House by Overwhelming Margin, Daily Lab. Rep (BNA) No. 135,
at A-9 (July 14, 1988) (reporting on passage of the plant closing bill in the House by a veto-proof
margin, with union lobbyists looking on).
53 See Clinton Signs Family Leave Bill Into Law, Proclaims End of Gridlock, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 24, at AA-1 to AA-2 (Feb. 8, 1993) (reporting on passage of the leave bill and the AFL-CIO's
strong support for it).
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III. ORIGINS OF NLRA's PROHIBITION OF COMPANY UNIONS
A. Labor Unrest and the Mood of Congress Leading Up
to Enactment of the NLRA
Extreme labor market conditions fed worker concerns, and even vio-
lence, in the early-and mid-1930s. Unemployment was extremely high;54
but even though this condition created a large supply of potential striker
replacements, and would therefore in theory suppress strike activity, strikes
occurred frequently in the early 1930s. 55 Senator Robert Wagner, who also
served as the Chairman of the National Labor Board before the NLRA was
enacted, had an explanation for this anomaly. He blamed most of 70% of
these strikes on defects in the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),
which he thought promoted sham or company unions.
56
Looking for ways to minimize worker unrest, Congress might simply
have outlawed all strikes. But this option was partly foreclosed by nearly a
century of common law precedent recognizing the legality of peaceful
strikes conducted for lawful purposes.5 7 Furthermore, by the 1930s Con-
gress had begun to side with the ordinary worker in his struggle against
large and powerful employers. In 1926 Congress enacted the Railway Labor
Act, thereby creating collective bargaining rights for rail and air transport
workers. 58 In 1932, it enacted the Norris-Laguardia Act, which greatly lim-
54 Unemployment was 20% in 1935, the year the NLRA was enacted, and 18.0% and 14.3%
in 1936 and 1937, respectively. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 916, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS 36 (1947) (Table A-12).
55 For example, in 1933 there were 599 strikes nationwide. To Create a National Labor Board,
1934: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Education, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, 43
(1934) (Statistics of Work of National Labor Board), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 70, 73 (1985) [hereinafter LEGISLATVE HISTORY].
56 The following testimony summarizes Senator Wagner's expert view:
[E]mployees are becoming impatient at the denial of their rights, and strikes and vio-
lence are appearing in various parts of the country. I am in a position to know this....
The first defect of [the National Industrial Recovery Act] is that it restated the right of
employees to bargain collectively, but did not impose on employers the duty to recog-
nize such representatives. Failure to acknowledge this correlative duty has caused more
than 70 percent of the disputes coming before the National Labor Board.
... The greatest barrier to [employee] freedom is the employer-dominated union,
which has grown with amazing rapidity since the passage of the Recovery Act.
The employer-dominated union generally is initiated by the employer. He takes
part in the determination of its rules, its procedures, its policies. He can terminate it at
will and he exercises absolute veto power over its suggestions. Certainly there is no real
cooperation on an equal footing between employers and employees under such
circumstances.
Id. at 8-9, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935,
at 38-39 (1985) (statement of Senator Wagner).
57 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842), was the first significant common-
law decision to recognize the legality of worker combination, or in modem terms, formation of a
labor union. There, seven bootmakers agreed that they would quit their employment if their
employer hired a new bootmaker in their shop who was willing to work for less money. Id. at 112-
14. The court opined that if the employees had threatened physical force or fraud to achieve
their economic goal of maintaining the wage-rate in the shop, "it would have been a very differ-
ent case." Id. at 132.
58 Railway Labor Act of 1926, Pub. L No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15, 18, 28, 45 U.S.C (1994)).
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ited federal court jurisdiction in labor disputes.59 This legislation grew
from a perception that courts were biased in favor of employers during
labor disputes.
60
B. The National Industrial Recovery Act and Proliferation of Company Unions
Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act (the "NIRA") in
1933 "[t]o encourage national industrial recovery, to foster fair competi-
tion, and to provide for the construction of certain useful public works." 6 1
Passed-during the depths of the Great Depression, this law depended on
employer and union compliance with a set of legally unenforceable work
codes.
The law's use of the term "fair competition" drew from a labor market
context. Labor unions recognized their economic self-interest in organiz-
ing as many workers in their industry as possible, in order to create uni-
form wages and working conditions.62 They believed that "yellow dog"
contracts, in which individual workers signed employment agreements
promising never to join a union, created unfair competition. 63
This background helps to explain section 7(a) of the Act, which estab-
lished these general criteria for codes of "fair competition":
(1) That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing . . . ; (2) That no
employee, and no one seeking employment, shall be required as a condi-
tion of employment to join any company union or to refrain from join-
ing, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing; and
(3) that employers shall comply with the maximum hours of labor, mini-
mum rates of pay, and other conditions of employment, approved or pre-
scribed by the President.64
Point 1, on its face, was intended to permit employees to freely choose
their own union and to engage in collective bargaining with their employ-
59 Norris-Laguardia Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1994)).
60 Representative LaGuardia stated Congress' intent in passing this law:
Gentlemen, there is one reason why this legislation is before Congress, and that one
reason is disobedience of the law on the part of whom? On the part of organized labor?
No. Disobedience of the law on the part of a few Federal judges.... If the courts had
administered even justice to both employers and employees, there would be no need for
considering a bill of this kind now.
75 Cong. Rec. 5,478 (1932) (statement of Rep. LaGuardia).
61 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 195 (1933) (Act held unconstitu-
tional in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
62 See, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 43 (1927)
(when a large manufacturer terminated its labor agreement with the stone cutters union, the
union responded by encouraging all of its members throughout the nation to boycott any work
involving use of "unfair" Bedford stone); see also Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S.
229, 244-46 (1917) (involving a massive effort by the United Mine Workers union to secretly sign
up coal miners in West Virginia, and then to launch a strike). Part of the union's motivation in
Hitchman was to stabilize wage rates in neighboring states, which were forced down by less expen-
sive coal from nonunion producers in West Virginia. Id. at 240-41.
63 See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908) (ruling that the Erdman Act, a law
forbidding yellow dog contracts, violated the due process rights of an employee "to sell his labor
upon such terms as he deems proper").
64 LEGIsLAT, E HIsTORY, supra note 55, at 46.
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ers through this representative. Point 2 reinforced this idea of free choice
by prohibiting an employer from interposing a sham union, and by stating
the principles for outlawing yellow dog contracts. Point 3 sought to stabi-
lize a vicious cycle of declining wage rates, which in turn might depress
economic demand and thus overall economic activity, by removing wages
from competition between employers. 65
But the NIRA was a failure in Senator Wagner's view because employ-
ers used company unions to subvert its principles.66 Abundant evidence in
the NLRA's hearings supported this view:
1. Employers' primary motive in establishing these organizations was
to preempt union organizing; and paradoxically, the NIRA accelerated this
process. For example, shortly after the NIRA was enacted:
Mr. T.H.A. Tiedeman, of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, [was]
quoted in Personnel, the magazine of the American Management Associ-
ation, for November 1933, as saying that one company, presumably his
own company, had sent out almost 2,000 copies of an outline of prepara-
tion and installation of an employee representation plan-
For the confidential use of many executives, who because of the In-
dustrial Recovery Act, are making inquiry as to the best method for
inaugurating a plan of collective bargaining between elected repre-
sentatives of employees and management.
67
Presenting statistical evidence of this highly organized management
response to the NIRA, Senator Wagner noted:
[T]hese unions have multiplied most rapidly since the enactment of the
law which was intended to guarantee to the worker the fullest freedom of
organization. The number of employees covered by company unions rose
from 432,000 in 1932 to 1,164,000 in 1933, representing a gain of 169
percent. More than 69 percent of the company-union schemes now in
existence have been inaugurated in the brief period since passage of the
Recovery Act.
6 8
2. Employers promised that these organizations would treat employees
fairly. This letter from C.W. Nash to persuade employees to join an em-
ployee representation committee offers a good example:
I would not be fair to you if I did not see to it that you got the real facts,
and therefore, I am now proposing a plan which I believe will serve to do
that thing and give you and the company a chance to sit down together
and discuss and decide matters ofmutual interest to all of us. I always
65 For an insightful interpretation of the centrality of this aim, as it was incorporated into the
NLRA, see Bruce E. Kaufman, Why the Wagner Act? Reestablishing Contact with Its Original Purposes,
in ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS (David Lewin et al. eds., forthcoming 1996).
66 Yesterday we had a hearing in the automobile industry and it came out very clearly
that the company union was formed by sending to each worker a constitution and by-
laws telling him, "This is now your organization." As the result of that an election was
held, and the workers testified that they voted because they knew very well if they did
not vote their jobs were gone.
LEGiSLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 55, at 110 (statement of Sen. Wagner).
67 Id. at 113.
68 Id. at 123.
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have believed that if we could do this in a spirit of friendly understanding
and confidence in each other, we would accomplish a great step forward
in promoting and maintaining the kind of relationship we all want in this
industry.
It seems to me that this company has now reached a degree of un-
derstanding and mutual respect between employees and management
that we can consider together practical means of giving effect to a plan
which I believe will assure lasting cooperation, goodwill, and prompt, fair
settlement of any questions that may arise.
I have sufficient confidence in the fairness of men to believe that
when they know the facts and have an equal voice in deciding matters
concerning them that they will come to decisions that are fair and
reasonable.
69
3. Company unions were nominally controlled by employees, but actu-
ally controlled by employers. General Motors' Pontiac plan provides a
good illustration of this illusory workplace democracy:
This provides for voluntary membership of all employees of the manufac-
turing department; that is, voluntary for all employees 21 years or more,
with at least 90 days of service and at least first papers. These employees
choose their representatives from among the members of their own divi-
sion with at least 1 year's service. They meet alone, but the factory man-
ager must be notified of all meetings. Management is present only when
requested. The meeting place is established by the works council subject
to the approval of the plant manager. The company pays the representa-
tives their regular earned rate, prints the ballots for elections, and elec-
tions are held on company time. In addition, the company wil furnish a
stenographer for any meeting on request.
The plan emphasizes that membership is voluntary, but it provides
that only members of the employees association have the right to make a
complaint to the works council with reference to wages, hours of labor,
working conditions, or other appropriate subjects. Only members have a
right to take out insurance and to participate in the company savings and
investment plans.
... In other words, they offer an inducement to the workers to come
into their company union, and say that he cannot be a beneficiary under
these plans otherwise.... In cases of disagreement, appeal is possible all
the way up to the general management of the company, who, it is said,
"will take up the subject for consideration."
70
4. Company unions had broad mandates to deal with employers con-
cerning working conditions and pay. Carnegie Steel had a plan that served
as model for others in the industry:
[A] t such conferences, negotiations may be carried on between repre-
sentatives of the employees and the representatives of management on:
Rules, ways and means, safety and prevention of accidents, economy and
69 Id. at 126-27.
70 Id at 128.
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waste prevention, wages, piecework, and tonnage rates, hours of employ-
ment and working conditions, housing and living conditions, health and
works sanitation, education and publications, athletics and recreation,
continuity of employment and conditions of industry.
71
C. Elements of Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA
All this evidence convinced a majority in Congress that company un-
ions were indeed a problem. The dilemma, then, was how to regulate
them without also interfering with an employer's inherent right to manage
and direct its workforce. Congress decided on a solution that was simple in
principle: return to the original purpose in section 7(a) of NIRA, permit-
ting employees to freely choose to have their own workplace representa-
tive. However, Congress wanted the law to have teeth this time, and
therefore wanted to ensure it defined unlawful conduct. It embodied this
principle in a thorough but also somewhat complicated format.
First, Congress directed its attention to nonunion workplaces where
numerous company unions already existed. It brought these sham unions
within the definition of a labor organization in section 2(5) by describing
the gamut of functions that these organizations performed, as well as the
names these organizations were called.7 2 Congress then made it unlawful
for an employer to dominate or interfere with such an organization. 73
Congress had in mind two specific concerns in prohibiting domina-
tion or interference. First, assuming as Congress did that disputes between
workers and employers should be adjusted by negotiations, an arms-length
relationship should exist between the workers' representative and the em-
ployer.7 4 Second, Congress intended to ensure that this kind of relation-
71 id. at 121-22.
72 Section 2(5) defines a labor organization as:
any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or
plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
A University of Wisconsin economics professor, Edwin E. Witte, played a critical role in help-
ing to fashion this definition. In Senator Wagner's first draft of the NLRA, a labor organization
was defined as "any organization, labor union, association, corporation or society of any kind, in
which the employees participate to any degree whatsoever, which exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, or hours of
employment." LEGist Arlv HISroRY, supra note 55, at 271-72. But Professor Witte testified, "I am
not certain that this includes what is known as the 'employee representation' committee, which is
the most prevalent form of company union." Id. at 272. This led Congress to broaden the defini-
tion of a labor organization to include "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
73 This was accomplished by defining the following employer .unfair labor practice in what is
now § 8(a) (2):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer... ; (2) to dominate or interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial
or other support to it ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
74 Sen. Wagner observed that critics of this conception "claimed that the bill would prevent
friendly relations between employers and employees becaues [sic] it prevents employers' from
influencing the rules or policies of labor organizations." LGXsLATrvE HISTORY, supra note 55, at
41. He then explained: "Such an interpretation strains beyond all reason the provisions of this
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ship existed by essentially prohibiting employers from contributing money
or other financial support to a labor organization. 75
IV. REGULATORY AMBIGUITy:. NLRB GUIDANCE IN
EFLECTROMA TION AND DUPONT
A. Electromation
For all the controversy surrounding this case, it is remarkable for its
mundane facts. Electromation employed almost 200 people to make varied
electrical products, and encountered financial problems in late 1988.76
Management decided to trim costs by substituting a lump sum payment for
next year's pay increase, and by revising its attendance policy. 77 At least 68
employees were unhappy about these changes, and in January 1989, wrote
a letter to the company president protesting these changes. 78 He re-
sponded by arranging a meeting between management and randomly se-
lected employees to discuss wages, bonuses, incentive pay, tardiness and
attendance, and sick leave; and concluding that management's unilateral
action might have been a mistake, he distilled the numerous complaints
made by these employees into five general subjects that "action commit-
tees" would address.
79
When he discussed this at a meeting with employees onJanuary 18, his
plan was opposed, but he convinced doubting employees that "we don't
have better ideas at this point than to sit down and work with you on
them"; as a result, action committees were formed to deal with (1) absen-
teeism/infractions, (2) the no smoking policy, (3) a communication net-
work, (4) pay progression for premium positions, and (5) an attendance
bonus program.80 Envisioning that each committee would have six employ-
ees and a management facilitator, the company asked for volunteers by
posting committee sign-up sheets; but when too few people signed up for
some committees, and some employees signed up for multiple committees,
an employee benefits manager made the final employee assignments.81
Although the smoking policy committee never met, the others did in
February, and the company paid employees for their time spent on com-
mittee work.8 2 Later, the benefits manager, acting as facilitator for the com-
mittees, explained that the "Committees would 'kind of talk back and
forth' with the other employees in the plant" to ensure wider representa-
tion of employee views.83 The attendance bonus committee made the most
bill. Frank and friendly negotiations depend upon the absence of influence exerted by one party
over another." Id.
75 See 1 id. at 1125. Congress made an exception for instances where an employer paid a
worker his wages while, during working hours, he put aside his job to represent fellow employees
involved in a dispute.
76 Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
77 Id. at 990-91.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 991.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 991-92 & n.6.
83 Id. at 991.
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headway by proposing a plan, but the company comptroller rejected it as
too costly.
8 4
To this point, the company was unaware that the Teamsters Union was
working with some employees on an organizing campaign; however, when
the union demanded recognition on February" 13, the company withdrew
itself from participation in the action committees, telling employees that
they could continue their participation if they desired. 5 Two committees
continued to meet but were disbanded on March 15 because of the union
campaign.8 6 A representation election occurred on March 31 where em-
ployees voted against representation 95 to 82; this precipitated a formal
complaint that the action committees violated section 8(a) (2) of the
NLRA.8 7
The NLRB took up this case after Electromation appealed the admin-
istrative lawjudge's finding of a section 8(a) (2) violation, and affirmed this
finding.88 It reasoned that the committees were section 2(5) labor organi-
zations because they were employee representation groups that dealt with
the company over matters such as pay and work conditions.8 9 It then found
that Electromation dominated these committees because the company,
and not the employees, first had the idea to form these committees and
then determined the committee purposes and. goals, size, and
composition. 90
In considering the ambit of section 2 (5), the majority opinion 9l stated
that even though "'dealing with' is broadly defined.., it is also true that an
organization whose purpose is limited to performing essentially a manage-
rial or adjudicative function is not a labor organization under section
2(5) ."92 This reasoning led the Board at various points to suggest that effi-
ciency, work process improvement, and product quality are managerial
subjects that fall outside the bounds of section 2(5).
Unfortunately, the Board did not develop this distinction fully and in
one place; rather, this conception dribbled out in piecemeal fashion. To-
ward the end of the majority opinion, the Board cryptically observed that
the "purpose of the Action Committees was... not to enable management
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 991-92.
87 Id. at 1015 (noted in the appendix).
88 Id. at 990.
89 The evidence thus overwhelmingly demonstrates that a purpose of the Action Com-
mittees, indeed their only purpose, was to address employees' disaffection concerning
conditions of employment through the creation of a bilateral process involving employ-
ees and management in order to reach bilateral solutions on the basis of employee-
initiated proposals. This is the essence of "dealing with" within the meaning of section
2(5).
Id. at 997.
90 Id. at 997-98.
91 Chairman Stephens and Members Devaney and Oviattjoined the majority opinion, but
Members Devaney, Oviatt, and Raudabaugh wrote lengthy concurrences which are not discussed
in this Article.
92 Elecromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 995. To illustrate this distinction, the Board then cited a
decision where an employer created ajob enrichment program by composing work crews made
up entirely of nonsupervisory employees, and another where a group of nonsupervisory employ-
ees resolved employee grievances without interacting with management.
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and employees to cooperate to improve 'quality' or 'efficiency.' '9 3 This
statement did nothing, however, to define terms such as efficiency or qual-
ity. Consequently, three concurring opinions elaborated on these terms,
but in very different ways. Devaney's concurrence noted that "the legisla-
tive history of the Wagner Act, although replete with expressions of out-
right alarm over the development of employer-dominated sham 'unions,'
shows virtually no concern over employer-initiated programs concerned
with efficiency, quality, productivity, or other essentially managerial is-
sues."' 94 Taking a different approach, Oviatt wrote a separate concurrence
"to stress the wide range of lawful activities which I view as untouched by
this decision";95 and he included "'quality circles' whose purpose is to use
employee expertise by having the group examine certain operational
problems such as labor efficiency and material waste"96 and more far-reach-
ing employee participation programs "involving worker self-fulfillment and
self-enhancement. '97 Member Raudabaugh appeared to take a more re-
strictive view when he said:
the list of subjects in Section 2(5) is a lengthy one. It includes such broad
terms as "conditions of work" and "labor disputes." It is hard to imagine
an employee committee that would be able to avoid these matters com-
pletely. Even if the committee's stated purpose is to deal only with such
entrepreneurial concerns as product quality or workplace efficiency, it
seems clear that the committee, in order to achieve its purpose, would
have to consider one or more of the subjects listed in Section 2(5). 98
B. DuPont
One reason Electromation became so controversial is that nine influen-
tial congressmen took the highly unusual step of filing an amicus brief in
the decision. 99 This is noteworthy because, less than two years later, many
of these congressmen, including Newt Gingrich, helped Republicans recap-
ture the Congress after a forty-year hiatus. Nothing about their brief was
93 Id. at 998.
94 Id. at 999.
95 Id. at 1004.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1008. The Board also concluded that the "purpose of the Action Committees was, as
the record demonstrates, not to enable management and employees to cooperate to improve
'quality' or 'efficiency,' but to create in employees the impression that their disagreements with
management had been resolved bilaterally." Id. at 998.
99 Id. at 990 n.2. Representatives Steve Gunderson and Newt Gingrich headed this group,
followed by William Goodling, who became Chair of the House committee in the 104th Congress
where the TEAM Act was reintroduced. They were joined by Representatives Don Ritter, Paul B.
Henry, Richard K. Armey, John Boehner, Mickey Edwards, Scott Klug, and Cass Ballenger. See
Congressional Group Urges Preservation of Participation Programs in Brief to NLRB, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 22, at A-9 (Feb. 3, 1992) (reporting that the brief argued that employee involvement
programs are "an essential element in restoring the United States' preeminent position in the
world economy"). One gets some sense, however, of this group's predisposition to overreact to
anything less than a completely agreeable decision when the brief stated that an adverse ruling
could spell an end to employee-management cooperative programs. In addition, the political
nature of this filing was made evident when the brief stated that "if the Board's interpretation of
the law effectively prevents employers from maintaining and establishing employee involvement
programs, amici will be compelled to seek a legislative remedy."
[Vol. 71:2
CAN TEAM WORK?
improper or out of place; the point simply is that leaders of a then-minority
political party understood Electromation well from an employer perspective,
and were prepared to make an issue of it. And they did this with some early
fanfare when they made the mere filing of their amicus brief a news
event. 100 In sum, opposition to Electromation was organized and ready to act
almost a year before the Board decided the case.
Thus, Electromation overshadowed the later decided DuPont. 10 ' DuPont
reads more as a continuation of unfinished thoughts leftover from Electro-
mation than a new lead case on how section 8(a) (2) applies in a union-
represented workplace. Sensing that the labor-management community
was carefully watching, the Board stated that it sought to "clarify"' this body
of law and to "emphasize" those cooperative employer efforts "because they
show that there is some room for lawful cooperation under the Act."'
02
So the Board began with a careful discussion of "safe havens"10 3 under
the "dealing with" provision of section 2 (5), observing that this. condition is
only met when there is a "'bilateral mechanism' ... [that] entails a pattern
or practice in which a group of employees, over time, makes proposals to
management, management responds to these proposals by acceptance or
rejection by word or deed, and compromise is not required."10 4 Emphasiz-
ing that "dealing with" does not preclude all forms of cooperative commu-
nication between employees and management, the Board then offered this
guidance: "[A] 'brainstorming' group is not ordinarily engaged in dealing.
The purpose of the group is simply to develop a host of ideas. Management
may glean some ideas from this process, and indeed adopt some of them. If
the group makes no proposals, the 'brainstorming' session is not dealing
and is therefore not a labor organization."' 0 5 The Board also suggested
that "if the committee exists for the purpose of sharing information with
the employer, the committee would not ordinarily be a labor organiza-
tion."' 0 6 In addition, the decision stated that "a 'suggestion box' proce-
dure where employees make specific proposals to management" does not
create "dealing because the proposals are made individually and not as a
group." 0
7
The Board then examined the decision-making apparatus of the em-
ployee committees involved in this case. Stating that although "[t] he mere
presence... of management members on a committee would not necessar-
100 Congressional Group Urges Preservation of Participation Programs in Brief to NLRB, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at A-9 to A-10 (Feb. 3, 1992).
101 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993). The case involved the Chemical Workers' challenge to seven
labor-management committees that the union claimed DuPont was using to bypass ordinary col-
lective bargaining. The Board found that two of the committees violated section 8(a) (2) and
section 8(a) (5), prohibiting bad faith bargaining, because "some committees dealt with issues
which were identical to those dealt with by the Union, and they brought about resolutions that
the Union had attempted and failed to achieve." Id. at 897.
102 Id. at 893.
,103 Id. at 894.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. The Board reasoned "if the committee make no proposals to the employer, and the
employer simply gathers the information and does what it wishes with such information, the
element of dealing is missing, and the committee would not be a labor organization." Id.
107 Id.
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ily result in a finding that the committee deals with the employer in terms
of Section 2(5),"108 in this case it found that the "dealing with" condition
existed.1 09
Turning to that part of section 2(5) defining dealt-with subjects that
establish the existence of a labor organization, the Board concluded that
two committees at DuPont "did not limit their activities to imparting infor-
mation or planning educational programs. Both committees also decided
on incentive awards to be given to unit employees .... Such awards are
benefits and compensation... and fall within the subjects set forth in Sec-
tion 2(5)." 110
Finding that some of DuPont's labor-management committees satis-
fied all the criteria of section 2(5), the Board turned to the section 8(a) (2)
issue: whether the employer dominated or interfered with these groups. It
readily found such a violation:
[T] he [company] ultimately retains veto power over any action the com-
mittee may wish to take. This power exists by virtue of the management
members' participation in consensus decision-making. The committee
can do nothing in the face of management members' opposition ....
The [company] also controls such matters as how many employees
may serve on each committee .... Unit employees had no independent
voice in determining any aspect of the composition, structure, or opera-
tion of the committees.
11'
Neither Electromation nor DuPont broke new doctrinal ground in construing
section 2(5). Forty years earlier, the Board found that the "dealing with"
condition of a labor organization existed where a company president held
a monthly question-and-answer session with employees, and as a result, al-
tered some working conditions.11 2 More recently, in General Foods Corp.,
113
the Board found that an employer's job enrichment program, dividing em-
ployees into small work teams, was not a section 2(5) labor organization
108 Id. at 895.
109 Id. The Board found that:
All the committees discussed proposals with management representatives inside the
committees. Each committee has management representatives who are full participating
members. These representatives interact with employee committee-members under the
rules of consensus decision-making as defined in the [employer's] Personal Effective-
ness Process handbook. The handbook states: 'consensus is reached when all members
of the group, including its leader, are willing to accept a decision.' Under this style of
operation, the management members of the committees discuss proposals with unit em-
ployee members and have the power to reject any proposal.... In our view, the fact that
the management persons are on the committee is only a difference in form; it is not a
difference of substance. As a practical matter, if management representatives can reject
employee proposals, it makes no real difference whether they do so from inside or





112 Stow Mfg., 103 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1953); see also Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 132
N.L.R.B. 993 (1961) (holding that a section 2(5) labor organization existed where an employee
communicated views to the employer, and later, the employer, at its discretion and without nego-
tiations, rejected or implemented suggestions made by the employee committee).
113 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
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even though it used a consensus style decision-making process for schedul-
ing work, making job assignments, and occasionally interviewing job appli-
cants. The administrative law judge in that case found that these activities
involved "managerial functions [that were] being flatly delegated to em-
ployees and do not involve any dealing with the employer on a group basis
or... within the meaning of Section 2(5).1"1
4
Nor did the Board break any new ground in interpreting employer
domination under section 8(a) (2). Soon after the NLRA was enacted, the
Board found unlawful domination where an employer retained a veto
power over an employee committee."15 The Supreme Court upheld this
view in Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. NLRB."16
V. THE TEAM Acr
A. Background to the TEAM Act
Early in the 104th Congress, Representative Steve Gunderson (R.-Wis-
consin) and Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R.-Kansas) introduced a bill to
amend the NLRA, called the TEAM Act.1 7 Gunderson explained that their
bill was needed because the NLRB used Electromation as a precedent to dis-
band five employee involvement programs in 1993.118 Although factually
correct, Gunderson probably overstated the importance of these post-Eec-
tromation decisions when he said that this decision called into question
"'virtually every current employee involvement program in the nation.""1 9
Before the TEAM Act was introduced, Congress had not seriously con-
sidered amending either section 2(5) or section 8(a) (2) since 1947. In
1947, a Republican Congress enacted sweeping legislative changes to the
NLRA. The Hartley bill, H.R. 3020, proposed a new section 8(d) (3):
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the following
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any
of the provisions of this Act:
(3) Forming or maintaining by an employer of a committee of em-
ployees and discussing with it matters of mutual interest, including
grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working condi-
tions, if the Board has not certified or the employer has not recog-
nized a representative as their representative under section 9.120
The Taft bill contained no such provision, but proposed to amend
Section 9 (a) of the Hartley bill, which at that time stated: "any individual
employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to pres-
114 Id. at 1235.
115 Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 866 (1938).
116 308 U.S. 241, 249 (1939).
117 See supra note 1.
118 GOP Lawmakers Propose Lifting Ban on Company-Sponsored Labor Committees, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 20, A-1 (Jan. 31, 1995).
119 Id.
120 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORy OF
THE LABOR MANACEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 56 (1985).
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ent grievances to, and settle grievances with, their employer."' 21 The Taft
bill differed as follows:
And to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent
with other terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in
effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been
given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.1 22
Later, a conference committee agreed to delete all of the House language,
and agreed to amend the NLRA with the Senate's proposal. 123
This background is relevant to the TEAM Act for two reasons. First,
when the Supreme Court was presented with an important section 8 (a) (2)
case in 1959, Cabot Carbon, Inc.,124 it cited this history to reject the em-
ployer's argument that its employee representation committees were not
labor organizations under section 2(5).125 Second, the 1947 Hartley provi-
sion that the Conference Committee rejected would have legalized com-
pany unions, because it would have applied to employee representation
committees in nonunion workplaces and would have permitted those com-
mittees to discuss the very matters Congress identified in 1935 as part of a
company union's sham work. 126 In contrast, the TEAM Act touches on
none of these controversial issues, but rather legitimizes only committee
handling of work process, efficiency, and product or service quality
matters.
B. The TEAM Act's Proposed Amendment to Section 8(a)(2)
Although this history is relevant in considering whether the TEAM Act
would result in the return of company unions, it was far from employers'
121 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 58 (1985).
122 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1947) (as passed by the Senate) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1947)), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS AcT, 1947, at 244 (1985).
123 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 549 (1985).
124 NLRB v. Cabot Carbon, Inc., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
125 The Court said:
Notwithstanding the fact that Congress rejected the House proposal of a new section, to
be designated § 8(d) (3), which, if adopted, would have permitted an employer to form
or maintain a committee of employees and to discuss with it matters of mutual interest,
including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working conditions, if
there was no employee representative, [the company] contended that Congress in-
tended to accomplish the same purpose by its amendment to § 9(a), and that, in conse-
quence, an employer, whose employees have no bargaining representative, may now
legally form or maintain a committee of employees and discuss with it the matters re-
ferred to in the proposed § 8(d)(3). We . .. conclude that there is nothing in the
amendment of § 9(a), or in its legislative history, to indicate that Congress thereby elim-
inated or intended to eliminate such employee committees from the term 'labor organi-
zation' as defined in § 2(5) and used in § 8(a) (2).
Id. at 217.




minds when they reacted angrily to Electromation.'27 Representative Gun-
derson responded to employer concerns shortly after Electromation was de-
cided by considering a bill far more radical than the TEAM Act.128 Given
employer opposition to Electromation from the. day it was decided, it is not
surprising that once Republicans regained control of the Congress, they
proposed a legislative response to Electromation.
The TEAM Act is intriguing and surprising, however, for its modera-
tion. In 1993, Gunderson was initially undecided whether to respond to
Electromation with a broad or a narrow amendment, and he turned to em-
ployers for advice in this matter.129 At first, he was leaning toward the more
sweeping approach, which would have entailed amending section 2(5) by
deleting "dealing with" and inserting "collective bargaining with" the em-
ployer over subjects such as wages, hours, or working conditions.1 30 This
would have greatly narrowed the definition of a labor organization to in-
clude only employee groups where unions are present. Considering that
section 2(5) covers most, but not all, private sector workplaces,' 3 ' and that
only 11% of private sector employees have union representation, 3 2 Gun-
derson's first idea would have nullified the protective reach of section 2 (5)
in most private sector workplaces. Such a proposal would have been a radi-
cal change in course for the NLRA.
127 See Randolph Heaster, Case Won't Hurt True Employee Panels, KAN. Crrv STAR, Feb. 7, 1993, at
Fll (reporting Phillip Scaglia's view that "if the ruling is misinterpreted, it could have serious
consequences for American industry's competitiveness"); Frank Swoboda, NLRB Ruling Tests How
Much Companies Trust Their Workers, WASH. PosT, Dec. 27, 1992, at H2 (reporting the Labor Policy
Association's characterization of Electromation as "totally unresponsive to workplace realities");
Michael A. Verespej, New Rules on Employee Involvemen INDUSTRY WEEK, Feb. 1. 1993, at 55 (report-
ing management attorney Martin Payson's view that Electromation "puts into question every partici-
pation group that employers have put into place the past 20 years," and management attorney
John Tysse's view that "the bottom line is that [Electromation] clearly crimps employee-involve-
ment efforts"); Steve Weinstein, Teams In Trouble?, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Feb. 1, 1993, at 93 (re-
porting a leading management lawyer's view that the NLRB "chickened out" by not expanding
employer rights in participative teams).
128 Rep. Gunderson Plans to Introduce Bill to Address Effects of Electromation Ruling, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 245, at A-16 (December 21, 1992). To appreciate the radical import of this
proposal, compare it to the Supreme Court's holding in Cabot Carbon, Inc., that section 2(5) is
broader than the term "collective bargaining" and applies to situations where no collective bar-
gaining agreement is being considered or negotiated. Cabot Carbon, Inc., 360 U.S. at 211. The
Court also recounted that when a Republican Congress enacted numerous changes in the NLRA
that were favorable to employers by passing the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, it nevertheless rejected a
proposed new section 8(d) (3) that would have allowed "forming or maintaining by an employer
of a committee of employees and discussing with it matters of mutual interest, including griev-
ances, wages, hours of employment, and other working conditions." Id. at 215.
129 Gunderson Seeks Management Consensus on Legislation to Overrule Electromation, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at A-4 to A-5 (Jan. 28, 1993) (reporting that Rep. Gunderson used a Jan. 27
breakfast meeting with the National Association of Manufacturers to seek an employer consensus
on responding to Electromation). The article reports that some employers favored amending
section 8(a) (2), while others felt that section 2(5) should be amended.
130 Rep. Gunderson Plans to Introduce Bill to Address Effects of Electromation Ruling, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 245, at A-16 (Dec. 21, 1992).
131 The Railway Labor Act covers employees in rail and air transportation, and does not con-
tain a section 2(5) labor organization definition. Section 2(3) expressly excludes the U.S. govern-
ment and "any State or political subdivision thereof' from the NLRA's definition of an employer,
and section 2(3) of the NLRA expressly excludes "agricultural laborer(s)" from the definition of
an employee covered under the act. Thus, sections 2(5) and 8(a) (2) offer no protection to rail
and air transport employees, agricultural laborers, and all government employees.
132 See supra note 44.
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But once Senator Gunderson actually proposed legislation in 1993, he
offered a much more moderate, narrow amendment of the NLRA. Instead
of narrowing the broad definition of a labor organization, his bill left sec-
tion 2(5) intact and proposed only to amend section 8(a) (2) by adding a
proviso that would exempt employee participation groups or plans that
handle matters of efficiency, productivity, or product quality.' 33 Although
this bill was unsuccessful, it was reintroduced once Republicans gained
control of the Congress in early 1995. The bill is intriguing because it ap-
pears to codify the guidance language in Electromation and DuPont, even
though employers responded with alarm to these principles.
Notably, the TEAM Act leaves the broad wording of section 2 (5) com-
pletely intact. It only proposes to amend section 8(a) (2), using language
from Electromation and DuPont. The amendment would change nothing in
the wording of section 8(a) (2), but would add:
Provided further, That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate
in any organization or entity of any kind, in which employees participate,
to address matters of mutual interest, including issues of quality, produc-
tivity and efficiency, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority to
negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements with the em-
ployer or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements between
the employer and any labor organization.1
3 4
Thus, the amendment does two things: it codifies the existing gui-
dance language in Electromation that says a section 8(a) (2) violation does
not occur, notwithstanding employer control over an employee group,
when subjects handled by the group are limited to quality, productivity,
and efficiency, 33 and it also implements the Board's guidance in Du-
Pont.136 The TEAM Act also proposes to amend the purpose statement of
the NLRA, but not in a way that would permit employers to use participa-
tive work teams or employee groups of any kind to undermine collective
bargaining.137
On its face, then, the TEAM Act is a very limited proposal to codify
much of Electromation's and DuPont's guidance language; but debate over
the bill, just like debate over Electromation,138 has been distorted. This de-
bate has featured employers characterizing Electromation as a grave threat to
133 H.R. 1529, 103d Cong., lst Sess. (1993); S. 669, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Gunderson Bill
Would Amend NLRA to Allow for Participation Programs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 60, at A-14 to A-
15 (Mar. 31, 1993).
134 Statement by Rep. Gunderson and Text of Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at E-33 (Jan. 31, 1995).
135 Compare supra text accompanying note 134 (line 4 of the TEAM Act) with supra notes 92-93.
136 Compare supra text accompanying note 134 (lines 5-7 of the TEAM Act) with supra note 110.
137 See Statement of Rep. Gunderson and Text of Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act, supra
note 136 (proposing to amend the purposes of the NLRA at section 2(b)). This amendment
states that the purpose of the act is: "(1) to protect legitimate Employee Involvement programs
against government interference; (2) to preserve existing protections against deceptive, coercive
employer practices; and (3) to allow legitimate Employee Involvement programs to continue to
evolve and proliferate." Id.
138 See Former NLRB Chairman Miller Calls Electromation Problem "Myth," Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 201, at A-5 (Oct. 20, 1993). This view has added cogency because the speaker was
President Nixon's appointee who after leaving office, served as a leading management lawyer.
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their interests, 3 9 and unions and academics characterizing the TEAM Act
as a prelude to restoration of 1930s-style company unions.
140
VI. FINDINGS OF EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH
ELECTROMA TION AND DUPONT
A. Development of Survey Questions
The survey was developed by analyzing Electromation and DuPont lan-
guage setting forth section 8(a) (2) compliance guidance. 14' For example,
DuPont discussed employers "dealing with" employee groups under section
2(5).142 A question was then formulated from this discussion, asking re-
spondents to indicate how group decisions were made. Choices came di-
rectly from this discussion, and respondents were instructed to answer
more than one if applicable. The following were the choices: the group
only discusses and makes no decisions, the group makes suggestions, the
group makes proposals that management considers, the group makes deci-
sions based on voting by group members, the group makes decisions by
informal consensus building, employees and managers negotiate, manag-
ers make decisions, managers modify decisions, and managers veto
decisions.' 43
Some questions did not come directly from either Electromation or Du-
Pont, but were asked because of their potential relevance to the broader
issue of whether these teams resemble company unions of the 1930s. For
example, the survey asked how many employees were part of the team or
group. 44 Many company unions were organized on a plant-wide basis, and
tended to be large organizations; 45 but as the results from this study show,
the teams in this study tended to be quite small, often with less than 20
people. This information suggests, but does not prove, that employee
139 Kodak Vice President Michael P. Morley testified before Congress that Electromation
"sounded an alarm to the 30,000 workplaces in the United States that have adopted employee
involvement .... Electromation ... came as a shock to those familiar with employment pol-
icy.... Electromation made it abundantly clear that section 8(a) (2) constitutes a serious threat
to workplace cooperation." Statements on the TEAM Act before the House Economic and Educational
Opportunities Committee, May 11, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 92, at E-1 (May 12, 1995).
140 See TEAMAct Gets Low Marks from Scholars of Labor Law Who Warn of Sham Unions, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 76, at C-1 (Apr. 20, 1995) (reporting that Professor Paula Voos, a member of the
Dunlop Commission, warned that the TEAM Act "failed to 'guard sufficiently against the return
of company unionism. . . '" and reporting a public letter from Professors Harry Katz, Hoyt
Wheeler, and Clyde Summers, who believe "that passage of the TEAM Act would quickly lead to
the return of the kind of employer-dominated employee organizations and employee representa-
tion plans that existed in the 1920s and 1930s").
Without explaining their reasoning or offering supporting evidence, Katz, Wheeler, and
Summers continued: "Indeed, because the proposed legislation applies even to workplaces where
the employees have selected a union as their exclusive representative, enactment of this bill
would free unionized employers to destablize bargaining relationships and undermine support
for the elected representative." This logic seems oblivious to the TEAM Act's expressly stated
purpose of protecting only "legitimate Employee Involvement programs" while "preserv[ing] ex-
isting protections against deceptive, coercive practices." Cf supra note 137.
141 Questions were drawn from the majority opinion and concurrences.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
143 See infra app. at 264 (survey Item IV(1)).
144 See infra app. at 263 (survey Item I(3)).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
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teams or groups in the 1990s are not the monolithic and manipulative or-
ganizations of the 1930s; rather, they tend to be organized by specific tasks
and functions.
B. Sampling Method
The sample consisted of twenty-three nonunion employee teams lo-
cated in Texas, Illinois, California, Ohio, Kentucky, Kansas, South Dakota
and Vermont. 46 All teams were located at manufacturing sites or servicing
centers, but nevertheless, performed highly varied functions. Sixteen teams
were directly involved in manufacturing, four were involved in design and
engineering, and three performed accounting functions.
The teams worked for six Fortune 500 employers who are partners in
the Center for Human Resources Management at the University of Illinois
(the "CHRM"). The Center funded this research, 47 and nineteen partner
firms were invited to participate. Surveys were sent to the offices of senior
vice presidents for human resources, or similar offices, and were then dis-
tributed to human resource managers at various plants. Surveys were com-
pleted from December 1994 through May 1995.
The surveys were completed by employees with a variety of responsibil-
ities. One survey from a Defense Department supplier was completed by
the plant superintendent who explained that fifty-six employees worked in
wholly autonomous teams with this superintendent as the only manager on
site. Three surveys were completed by engineers who were team members,
and eight surveys were completed by human resource managers at the
plant. In ten surveys, no inference could be made as to whether the respon-
dent was a manager or non-supervisory employee.
C. Flaws in the Sampling Method and Survey
The results and conclusions reported in this Article are limited by seri-
ous flaws in the sampling method and survey. The sample's small size is an
obvious limitation, and means that the results and conclusions may not be.
generalized.
The sample is drawn from Fortune 500 firms that, in addition, are
members of an academic research consortium. This suggests that these em-
ployers may, to an unrepresentative degree, devote attention to human re-
source management and strategy. The teams that were surveyed are likely
the product of this planning. While there are advantages in surveying For-
tune 500 employers, because of their large impact on the national econ-
omy, their likely dissimilarity to smaller and more common firms is also a
disadvantage.
146 A parallel survey was created for union-represented workplaces, but only three comileted
surveys were received. This response was too small to provide meaningful statistical analysis. Fur-
thermore, because the survey questions were different from the nonunion surveys, these surveys
could not be analyzed with the nonunion surveys, in order to reflect the different interactions
that might occur in the context of collective bargaining.
147 A committee of partner representatives, consisting of senior vice presidents for human




The method for distributing the survey also raises some questions.
Some CHRM employers provided a list of names and addresses, and the
survey was sent directly from the University of Illinois to the workplace.
Other employers requested that surveys be given to their office. These
surveys were distributed under a cover letter from headquarters. In all
cases, I received a copy of the cover letter. Each was brief and gave no overt
indication of how the respondent was to answer questions. The advantage
of this distribution method is that it resulted in a higher response rate, but
it is also fair to question whether a memo from a superior resulted in some
biased answers.14"
Whether or not the respondent was a manager or a non-supervisory
employee might also have biased the answer. Conceivably, a manager and a
non-supervisory employee participating on the same team would have dif-
ferent perceptions about how the group operates. This is a relevant con-
cem because a key aspect of this study is to determine the degree to which
these teams were controlled or dominated by management.
Finally, the survey's questions were flawed to some degree. For exam-
ple, an apparently simple question asked respondents to classify their team
or group as an Employee Involvement Program, Employee Committee,
Quality-of-Worklife Program, Work Team, or other employee group.
Although these are common names for such groups, and even though
these classifications have distinct meanings, 149 it is not clear that the re-
spondents understand these terms as they are commonly used or that the
respondents apply these meanings consistently. One person's Employee In-
volvement Program might be functionally identical to another's Work
Team. Thus, statistical variation over these categories might simply be an
artifact of the survey.
All of these amount to serious limitations but are offset by several con-
siderations. Although the sample is quite small, it has great geographic di-
versity. It is also diverse in terms of products or services, consisting of plants
that make nuclear weapons components, food additives, sophisticated elec-
tronics, packaging commodities, and mass-marketed paper products.
The problem of response bias was addressed by stating in the opening
paragraph of the survey that answers would be treated anonymously and by
providing respondents a self-addressed envelope for return directly to the
University of Illinois. 150 In this respect, it must be noted that no CHRM
representative asked how many surveys I received from his or her firm's
workplace. Over 50% of the respondents chose to identify themselves by
returning their survey in company stationery, but at no time did I report
specific surveys to CHRM representatives.
Finally, the potential for bias was addressed by asking a large number
of questions requiring descriptive rather than evaluative answers. For exam-
ple, the survey asked: What is the length of employee participation? Two
choices were provided: a fixed, definite term, or indefinite participa-
148 The concern here is that managers completing the survey would realize they were being
evaluated in some sense, and would therefore bias answers to make themselves look good in the
eyes of their superiors.
149 For an overview of these differences, see Nunn, supra note 16.
150 See infra app. at 263 (introductory paragraph).
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tion. 15' Another question asked respondents to check any of the following
subjects as those handled by the team: pay, insurance, safety, discipline,
fitness/health, tardy/absence policy, work process improvements, vacation,
leave, product or service quality, or other. 52
The factual nature of these answers is important, because the compli-
ance analysis provided here was based on this information, and not subjec-
tive judgments about employer domination or control of the team.
D. Findings
1. Finding 1
Most of the teams were small. Figure 1 shows that six of the twenty-two
respondents had fewer than ten members, and five had between ten and
nineteen members. 53 Thus, half of the teams were small. The possible sig-
nificance of this finding is that small group size facilitates individual partici-
pation. Teams of this size lend credence to employer claims that this
organizational form is being used to empower employees. Five teams fell
into a roughlymid-size category, with three having between twenty and
thirty-nine members, one with forty-five members, and one with fifty-six
members.
Six teams were relatively large. These teams had 120, 134, 140, 276
(two separate teams), and 500 members. The one respondent with a team
FIGURE 1: SIZE OF TEAM OR GROUP
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151 See infra app. at 264 (survey Item III(3)).
152 See infra app. at 265 (survey Item V(1)).




of 500 is superficially reminiscent of an old company union; that is, a plant-
w'de organization to deal with employees. The two teams with 276 mem-
bers also appear to fit this description. For teams ranging from 120 to 140,
not even a preliminary assessment about group dynamics can made. More
information about the work context is needed to make this assessment.
Findings 2-7 are taken from Figure 2, which should be treated like a
flowchart. It considers seven different elements that Electromation and Du-
Pont identify as being part of sections 2(5) and 8(a) (2). No single element
determines employer compliance under the NLRA, but certain patterns
may suggest where compliance problems exist with teams.
To illustrate: The third element under section 2(5) presents data
about subjects that teams handle. Three respondents stated that pay is one
of these subjects. Since pay is contained in the section 2(5) definition of a
labor organization,' 5 4 these three teams have potential compliance
problems.
The survey was not detailed enough to determine whether an actual
violation was present. For example, if the team handled a pay issue only
once, but routinely handles efficiency matters, it is conceivable that the
Board would rule that the team does not constitute a labor organization,
because it does not exist to handle matters of compensation.
The usefulness of this flowchart, however, is its presentation of data
tendencies. We can see, for instance, that twenty-one of the twenty-three
surveyed groups handled work process issues. While this datum does not
yield a legal conclusion, nor even a public policy conclusion, it fills an in-
formational void in which commentators are guessing about the extent to
which teams treat work process issues. In short, it gives a limited empirical
picture of how the structure, governance, and activties of these teams
roughly correspond to Electromation and DuPont's compliance guidelines.
154 See supra note 72.
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FIGURE 2: E.LECTROMA TION AND DUPOWT COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS OF 23
PARTICIPATIVE WORK GROUP TEAMs WITH No UNION
NLRA SECTION 2(5)
Indicative of Indicative of
Inquiry Compliance Fuzzy Zone Violation
'Dealing with" Discusses (1) Consensus (17) Manager Decides
employees: How Suggests (11) Vote (10) (6)155
does team interact Proposes (15)
with management?
What subjects does Work Process (21) Safety (8)







NLRA SECTION 8(a) (2)
Indicative of Indicative of
Inquiry Compliance Fuzzy Zone Violation
Who created the Employees (6) Management & Management (16)
team? Employees (1)
Who selects team Voluntary (9) Management (9)
members? Peers (5)
Who directs team Employees (10) Management & Management (5)
activities? Employees (17)
Who evaluates the Employees (2) Mangement & Management (2)
team or group? External Party (6) Employees (9)
2. Finding 2
A question was asked to determine the extent to which employees
"deal with" employees through teams.156 Since "dealing with" and group
decision-making can be joined as a single process, Item IV(l) on the survey
155 Responses indicating that management decides, changes or vetoes overlap Sections 2(5)
and 8(a) (2).
156 See infra app. at 264 (survey item Part IV(1), under heading Group's Decision Making
Powers, asking respondents to "[d]escribe how the group makes decisions. Check more than one
if applicable."). Possible responses were "the group only discusses and makes no decisions," "the
group makes suggestions," "the group makes proposals that management considers," "the group
makes decisions by informal consensus building," "managers make decisions," "managers modify
decisions," and "managers veto decisions."
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arrayed these responses together. It should be noted, however, that in Du-
Pont the Board treated employer vetoes not as a section 2(5) issue-even
though a veto is a form of "dealing with" employees-but rather, as a domi-
nation and interference issue under section 8(a) (2).157
Just one respondent stated that the team only discussed matters with
the employer, while eleven stated they only made suggestions. These twelve
groups would seem to lack the kind of bilateral interaction that the Board
in DuPont stated was necessary to satisfy the "dealing with" provision in sec-
tion 2(5).158 Nevertheless, the survey does not permit the conclusion that
roughly half the teams had no bilateral interaction with employers, because
respondents were permitted to check multiple responses. Not all of the
eleven teams answering that they made suggestions checked only that
response.
Fifteen groups made proposals to management. This finding is in the
fuzzy compliance zone because there is too little information as to how the
employer responded to this communication. DuPont states that if a team
makes a proposal unilaterally, and the employer does not communicate a
response, the "dealing with" provision is not satisfied.'5 9 On the other
hand, if an employer responds to a team's proposal with a counter-propo-
sal, then bilateral interaction clearly is occurring. This is evidence of the
existence of a labor organization, but is not alone dispositive of the issue. If
this bilateral interaction concerns work process or product quality, Electro-
mation suggests that no labor organization exists.
16 0
Seventeen respondents stated they made decisions by informal consen-
sus. This is interesting because it suggests the prevalence of informal deci-
sion making processes in these groups. Unfortunately, this finding alone
does not have legal relevance, and therefore is put in the fuzzy zone of
compliance. On the other hand, these data suggest that current teams dif-
fer from company unions, because company unions were governed by for-
mal bylaws and charters,16' while current teams operate much more
informally.
The survey also provided information on the extent to which manage-
ment changed or altered team decisions. Managers made decisions in six
teams, changed decisions in eight teams, and vetoed decisions in four
teams. Since making, changing, and vetoing team decisions connote con-
trol, and therefore, domination, these are listed as indicated violations; but
again, stress must be laid on the fact that the survey does not permit a legal
conclusion. If this employer domination occurred in a team that dealt only
with work efficiency matters, Electromation62 and DuPont 63 suggest that no
section 8(a) (2) violation would occur.
Even though these responses lead to no legal conclusions, they may
indicate the extent to which employers keep their hands off team deci-
157 See supra note 109.
158 See supra text accompanying note 104.
159 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
160 Eectromation, 309 N.L.1.B. 990, 1001-02 (1992).
161 LEGISLATrvE HisroRy, supra note 55, at 121-22.
162 See supra notes 76798 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
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sions. In this survey, managerial alteration of decisions occurred in eight of
twenty-three, or about one third, of the teams.
3. Finding 3
This finding resulted from answers to Survey Item V(1).164 This Item
was derived from Electromation's165 and DuPontS'166 guidance creating "safe
harbors" of subjects that fall outside of section 2(5).
Twenty-one respondents (roughly 90%) answered that their team han-
dled work process matters. Consistent with this finding, fifteen teams re-
ported handling product or service quality matters. The Board in
Electromation appeared to approve of these activities,1 67 and in DuPont im-
plied that these activities are lawful because they do not touch on compen-
sation or benefits.1 68 But the data also show that some groups handled
more than work process matters: eight handled safety, six handled disci-
pline, five handled vacations, four handled fitness and health matters, four
handled tardy and absence policies, three handled pay, and two handled
employee leaves. All of these fall under section 2(5)'s broad definition of
subjects handled by a labor organization. 169
One of this survey's major limitations, no weighing of a team's time or
resources spent on these subjects, is evident here. The fact that 90% of the
teams are involved with work process issues, and roughly 65% are involved
with quality issues, suggests but does not prove that these activities are
teams' primary concerns. While the survey shows that one third of the
teams handle section 2(5) subjects, it does not reveal how much time is
spent on these activities. Consequently, no definite conclusion can be
made about team compliance with Electromation and DuPont. What the data
show is that one third of these teams are risking compliance problems
under the NLRA by handling section 2(5) subjects.
Even though this percentage appears to be somewhat high, it must be
remembered that a team's handling of these subjects is not alone disposi-
tive in a section 8(a) (2) case. If a team is free from employer domination
or interference, either because there is no bilateral interaction on these
matters, or because the employer removes itself entirely from the process
of making decisions about what the team is doing in this matter, there
would appear to be no violation of the NLRA.
4. Finding 4
Two thirds of the teams were created by management. This finding
resulted from Item 11(2), asking "[w]ho created the group?"'170 Six teams,
164 This item states: "Describe the subjects handled by the group. Check more than one if
applicable." Responses included "pay, insurance, safety, discipline, fitness/health, tardy/absence
policy, work process improvement, vacation, leave, and product/service quality."
165 See supra text accompanying notes 93-98.
166 See supra text accompanying note 110.
167 See supra text accompanying note 93.
168 See supra text accompanying note 110.
169 See supra note 72 (defining a labor organization).
170 See supra text accompanying note 90.
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or about one fourth, were created only by employees, and one was jointly
created by employees and management.
The data show that in nonunion workplaces, employers are primarily
responsible for creating participative teams. The significance of this find-
ing is that a team's creation by management may be an important factor
indicating employer domination or interference under section 8(a) (2).
But this question alone is not dispositive of the section 8(a) (2) issue. If an
employer creates a team, but empowers it to act on its own, employer domi-
nation or interference might not exist. Finding 2, showing that seventeen
teams operate by informal consensus building, and showing that manage-
ment changes only one third of the teams' decisions, tends to demonstrate
that these teams enjoy considerable autonomy. In short, evidence here sug-
gests that while management creates many teams, it may empower them to
the point of mooting the claim of employer domination or interference.
5. Finding 5
Item 111(1) in the survey asked respondents to "describe how employee
participation occurs. Check more than one if applicable." 17 The Item was
derived from portions of Electromation'7 2 and DuPontl73 focusing on how
employees were selected for the team.
The results show a diverse recruitment pattern for teams, with an
equal number of teams composed of volunteer members (nine), or em-
ployees selected by management (nine). Peer selection occurred in five (or
about one fifth) of the teams. The results for peer and volunteer selection
are not indicative of employer domination or interference, because em-
ployers do not control these selections.
But while this is true in a general sense, Electromation shows that these
results should not be overinterpreted. There, after the company president
asked for volunteers but found that too few signed up to compose various
action committees, his employee benefits administrator was given the task
of selecting action committee members.' 7 4 In short, although the employer
in Electromation was found to have dominated a labor organization partly
because it selected team members, the Board ignored the fact that manage-
ment really wanted voluntary employee participation.' 75
Thus, it would seem that whenever management selects team mem-
bers, it adds a risk factor under Electromation. Selection of team members
would therefore be problematic for a considerable number of teams in the
general population (since nine teams, or about 30%, had this selection
procedure). But again, this factor alone is not dispositive, especially where
a team confines itself to work process or quality issues, and thereby
removes the team from the labor organization category.
171 Respondents were able to select from "employees are selected," "employees volunteer,"
"employees participate as part of theirjob," "employees are elected by peers," and "employees are
appointed by management."
172 See supra text accompanying note 90.
173 See supra text accompanying note 111.
174 See supra text accompanying note 81.
175 See supra text accompanying notes 81, 90.
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6. Finding 6
The Board in Electromation'76 and DuPont177 analyzed the extent of
employer control of team activities when it considered the section 8(a) (2)
issue. The survey approached this issue in two ways: (i) by having respon-
dents describe how their teams make decisions, 78 and (ii) by asking in
Item 111(4), "[h] ow is the group's work determined? Check more than one
if applicable."
17 9
Direction by employee initiative occurred in twice as many teams (ten,
or about 40%) as management directive (five, or about 20%). Here the
survey's specific use of the terminology "employee initiativd' merits empha-
sis because this behavior indicates team autonomy. Because respondents
were told to check more than one answer where applicable, this finding
about team autonomy has limited significance. There were seventeen re-
sponses indicating that the team was at least sometimes directed by an em-
ployee-management consensus.' 80 It appears that some teams occasionally
act autonomously, and at other times act on an ambiguous consensus.
Since the survey did not provide for weighted responses to indicate the
degree of autonomous action, and also did not have a question to ascertain
whether a team's autonomy was linked to deciding subjects such as pay and
conditions of work,' 81 no legal conclusions about these groups can be
made.
7. Finding 7
Item VII(2) asked respondents, "If the group is evaluated, who evalu-
ates? Check more than one, if applicable."' 8 2 Neither Electromation nor Du-
Pont examined this issue, but this question was asked because evaluation
implies control and accountability, and therefore appears to be relevant to
the section 8(a) (2) issue of employer domination or interference. Employ-
ees rarely evaluated team performance without management participation
in this process (it occurred with only two teams, or about 10%); but this
was also the case for evaluations performed only by managers. The more
common methods of evaluation were by employees and management (nine
teams, or 30%), and by an external party (six teams, or 20%). While this
Finding has no great significance, it is consistent with evidence showing
176 See supra text accompanying note 90.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
178 See supra note 154.
179 See infra app. at 264. Responses included "Management Directive," "Management-Em-
ployee Consensus," and "Employee Initiative."
180 Compare Finding 6 with Finding 1, supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. Consensus
would seem to be a workable decision-making process in small groups.
181 Hypothetically, in a mixed control situation where an employer dominated work process
issues, but was completely laissez-faire in safety issues, it is conceivable that the Board would find
no employer violation. Since section 2(5) does not include work process matters, it would seem
that employers are free to dominate teams that handle these matters, because when these teams
act in this capacity, they are not labor organizations. If that team then handled a section 2(5)
issue such as pay or safety, the Board might then look for evidence of employer domination or
interference; but if the employer permitted the team to act autonomously on these matters, the
Board might find that there was no domination of the labor organization.
182 See infra app. at 266.
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that most teams use consensus decision making, because the primary mode
of evaluation is also collaborative.
VII. WHAT THE FINDINGS IMPLY FOR THE TEAM ACT
A. Critics of the TEAM Act Cite Insufficient Evidence to Support Their
Conclusions
Critics of the TEAM Act have warned that this legislation promotes the
return of 1930s company unionism. 83 Their assertions are remarkable,
however, for failing to cite any supporting studies or empirical evidence.
This is troubling for several reasons. These critics are prominent and
respected members of the labor law and industrial relations academies,
and so their views should be taken seriously.'84 In addition, the potential
danger they point to is very serious; in effect, they equate the TEAM Act to
an evisceration of the NLRA.185 Moreover, they make blanket indictments
of the TEAM Act, failing, in the process, to account for many employee
participation programs that unions rate as positive experiences. 186 Finally,
their public pronouncements are conclusory statements that fall to men-
tion that the bill proposes to codify the guidance language of Electromation.
At the least, these critics should explain how specific provisions of the bill
enlarge employer safe havens spelled out by Electromation and DuPont to the
point of returning company unions.
These criticisms are all the more ironic because they come from sev-
eral members of the Commission for the Future of Worker-Management
Relations (the "Dunlop Commission"). Empaneled by President Clinton to
183 See Chris Murphy, Teamwork on Tria GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, June 11, 1995, at F1 (statement
of Professor Hoyt Wheeler) ("If you're in favor of this legislation, you favor establishing the kind
of company unions that dominated before 1935.... As a management lawyer I could create an
illegitimate company union in a half hour under the TEAM Act."). Professor Wheeler was joined
by Professors Clyde Summers and Harry Katz in leading a controversial petition drive to portray
the TEAM Act as a return to company unionism. Bob Bouyea, Three Professors Are Targets of Cat
Letter, PEORAJ. STAR, July 18, 1995, at Cl.
184 Three professors have led a petition drive to defeat the TEAM Act: Professors Harry C.
Katz, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations; Clyde W. Summers, University of
Pennsylvania School of Law; and Hoyt N. Wheeler, College of Business Administration, University
of South Carolina. Labor Law Professors Urge Congress to Reject TEAM Act Before House Pane4 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 120, atA-10 (June 22, 1995) (reporting that 340 academics and 75 arbitra-
tors signed their letter petitioning Congress to reject the TEAM Act).
185 The letter charged that the TEAM Act would:
[n]egate the original purpose of section 8(a) (2) by permitting without limitation a revi-
val of the very practices against which section 8(a) (2) was aimed. The legislation con-
tains no safeguards to guarantee that employer-created representation plans function
democratically and independently of the employer. Nor is there anything in the bill
which would prevent employers from manipulating employer-controlled organizations
in order to thwart genuine employee voice.
As a result, we are persuaded that passage of the TEAM Act would quickly lead to
the return of the kind of employer-dominated employee organizations and employee
representation plans which existed in the 1920s and 1930s.
Id.
186 See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COOPERATWE PARTNERSHIP: A NEW BEGINNING FOR NATIONAL
SEtL CORPORATrON AND THE UNrrFD STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA (1989); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
QuALriy OF WORK LIFE: AT&T AND CWA EXAMINE PROCESS AFTER THREE YEARS (1985); LeRoy,
supra note 11, at 1839-43.
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suggest labor law reforms, 187 and promising in its mission statement to in-
vestigate "new methods or institutions... to enhance work-place productiv-
ity through labor-management cooperation and employee
participation,"'188 this Commission's final report described employee partic-
ipation programs in positive terms.189 In a press conference with Secretary
of Labor Reich, Chairman Dunlop strongly suggested that workplace teams
are essentially good, and that the NLRA puts undesirable barriers in their
way.190 But a few months later, his public pronouncements about these
workplace organizations contradicted this view. The Commission's report
was considered a dead letter, however, after the November 1994 elections
that brought Republicans to power. 191 This history gives the critics' attack
something of a sour-grapes quality.
B. Survey Implications for the TEAM Act
The compliance survey used here asked questions from Electromation
and DuPont's guidance language, and because that guidance tended to be
general, the questions were not made to be more specific. To make these
questions more specific-for example, by asking respondents to assign
187 Reich, Brown Announce New Panel To Examine Workplace Cooperation, Employee Participation,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at AA-1 (Mar. 25, 1993).
188 Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations: Mission Statement, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 56, at F-1 (Mar. 25, 1993).
189 See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE FUTuRE OF WORKER-MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS (JAN. 9, 1995), reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at Special Supple-
ment (Jan. 10, 1995). The very first goal listed by the Commission for the 21st Century American
workplace is to "[e]xpand coverage of employee participation and labor-management partner-
ships to more workers, more workplaces, and to more issues and decisions." Id. at 4.
The Commission's first recommendation is to "[f]acilitate the growth of employee involve-
ment. The Commission recommends that nonunion employee participation programs should
not be unlawful simply because they involve discussion of terms and conditions of work or com-
pensation where such discussion is incidental to the broad purposes of these programs." Id. at 8.
This is a remarkable statement because it essentially ignores the distinction Electromation made
between groups that handle only work process, efficiency, or product quality matters, and section
2(5) subjects, such as pay and conditions of work.
The Report continues: "We believe that [employee involvement programs] .... which are
proliferating in the U.S. today, do not violate the basic purposes of Section 8(a) (2). Therefore,
we recommend that Congress clarify Section 8(a) (2) and that the NLRB interpret it in such a way
that employee participation programs operating in this fashion are legal." Id.
While agreeing with the Report's recommendation and reasoning, Commissioners Dunlop
and Voos, several weeks later, forcefully criticized the TEAM Act, even though the Act leaves
section 2(5) intact and appears to agree with the Commission's Report that employee involve-
ment needs to be encouraged.
190 Press Conference Subject: Dunlop Commission Report on the Future of Worker/Management Rela-
tions, FED. NEws SERV. WASH. PACKAGE (June 2, 1994), available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 8372529
(statement of Chairman Dunlop) ("employee participation, which has grown and is designed to en-
hance efficiency, performance, quality, and the high performance workplace ... may well be constrained,
in the view of many employers, by our existing statutory arrangements.... [P]art of that is the
classic legal division of workers, supervisors, and managers which in that division tends to inhibit
the sort of workplace cooperation and organization of work. . . .") (emphasis added).
Eleven months later, he declared that the Commission he chaired "would not countenance
[for] a minute for lots of reasons" the TEAM Act, even though the Act uses very similar language
to his press conference statement. Dunlop Urges Cooperation Between Labor and Management Inside
Beltway, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 91, at A-10 to A-1I (May 11, 1995).
191 See Dead on Arrived, INDUSTRY WEEK, Feb. 6, 1995, at 56 (reporting management lawyerJohn
Tysse's observation that "[t he Report almost borders on the trivial," and that it did little more
than "identify a problem, pose the options, and then walk away.").
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weights to subjects their teams handled-would have the effect of substitut-
ing my interpretation of sections 2(5) and 8(a) (2) for the Board's, and
would therefore give an inaccurate sense of how teams comply with these
seminal decisions. In short, given the generality and ambiguity of the gui-
dance provided in these decisions, a compliance analysis cannot provide a
definite picture of team compliance.
Nevertheless, these two decisions offer a consistent interpretation of
the NLRA in light of current employee participation programs. Moreover,
these interpretations go farther than previous decisions in setting forth
general guidelines for determining team compliance with sections 2(5)
and 8(a) (2). Even though this survey does not result in legal conclusions
about team compliance with these provisions, it paints a broad-brush em-
pirical picture of how twenty-three participative teams scattered through-
out the nation comply with these advisory principles. This picture can be
used now to assess the arguments for and against the TEAM Act; while this
assessment has considerable limitations, it is based on more detailed and
relevant information than the theoretical or hypothetical or single-case ar-
guments offered in congressional testimony' 92 or news accounts. 93
Here, then, is what this study's findings imply for the TEAM Act:
Current teams appear to lack the basic organizational characteristics
of company unions. Finding I showed that half the teams had fewer than
twenty members, and another quarter had between twenty and fifty-six
members. This suggests that current teams are organized in small func-
tional cells. This organizational form stands in sharp contrast to the typical
company union, which was a large scale, plant-wide organization.' 94
Other findings are consistent with this conclusion. Numerous small
teams in a workplace appear to be inefficient organizations for the kind of
manipulation and domination of employee representation that company
unions perpetrated. But small teams appear to be well suited to achieve
task-specific goals. Finding 3, discovering that 90% of the teams handled
work process matters and 60% handled product or service quality matters,
indicates that most participative teams in the 1990s focus legitimately on
matters of intrinsic managerial interest.
Not only do most teams have an organizational form better suited to
legitimate employer interests in improving work process and product or
service quality, but this form appears to carry over into legitimate empower-
ment of employees. Findings 2 and 6, showing respectively that 70% of
teams operate on the basis of informal consensus, and that twice as many
teams are directed by employee initiatives compared to those directed by
management initiatives, suggest that teams are empowered to a considera-
ble degree. To be sure, these findings do not indicate how much employ-
ees were empowered, and it is also true that a team with a single manager
and several nonsupervisory employees built around informal consensus can
192 See, e.g., supra note 4.
193 See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
194 See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
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be a coercive management instrument where employees conform their
views to agree with the manager.195
But these data suggest that this is not often the case. Since the typical
team is small, individual employees are more likely to be more assertive
than they would in a large-scale organizations. In contrast, plant-wide com-
pany unions tended to mold individual participation to fit employer objec-
tives that were more directed to frustrating union organization than
improving work process or product quality.' 96 In short, although size of
work teams is not alone determinative, it seems related to the employer
domination issue.
In theory, employers can still dominate a large workplace with numer-
ous small teams by vetoing each team's decisions, but this would appear to
be a cumbersome process from an employer's perspective. Here it is inter-
esting to note that the Board in DuPont found that only two of seven teams
in a large chemical plant had violated section 8(a) (2).197 This case, then,
appears to illustrate the point that division of the workplace into numerous
teams creates structural barriers for imposition of the kind of monolithic
employer control that the 1935 Congress found so troubling in company
unions.
Consistent with this emerging picture of small, task-directed, and par-
ticipative organizations, the finding that employees volunteered for teams
as frequently as management made team assignments indicates that more
employers are pushing power down to the "shop floor." This stands in con-
trast to evidence from the 1930s indicating that employers tied representa-
tive workplace organizations to a much more hierarchical control structure
where employee participation was often coerced or manipulated.
198
Also, Finding 7, showing that teams are more often evaluated by exter-
nal parties rather than managers acting alone or employees acting alone,
gives more credence to employer characterizations that these programs are
unlike company unions. Unfortunately, this study did not pinpoint what
external review meant in particular settings. An outside consultant may
have done the review, or it may have been done by another team in the
firm. The general significance of an external review, however, should not
be lost in this discussion. This kind of process connotes an openness, hon-
esty, and willingness to expose problems and difficulties that company un-
ions lacked.
These findings are also consistent with a growing body of anecdotal
and case-study evidence showing that teams in the 1990s differ markedly
from company unions that grew out of NIRA. Instead, the employer vision
reflected in current teams appear to be more consistent with views held by
corporate liberals in the 1920s,199 or the highly influential industrial psy-
chologist, Elton Mayo, who derided his generation's mechanistic view of
how workers produce:
195 See supra text accompanying note 108.
196 See supra text accompanying note 68.
197 See supra note 109.
198 See supra text accompanying note 70.
199 See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
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We have failed to train students in the study of social situations; we have
thought that first-class technical training was sufficient in a modem and
mechanical age. As a consequence, we are technically competent as no




It appears that an employer's purpose in forming teams often has little
or nothing to do with avoiding unions. This is not to suggest that employ-
ers are no longer interested in thwarting union organization; to the con-
trary, much evidence suggests that employers wish to keep unions out of
their.workplaces.2 0 Employers today threaten to arrest union organizers
for the most trivial kinds of trespass to property;202 they fire employees who
are behind organizing efforts;20 3 they use thinly veiled threats of unemploy-
ment20 4 or plant-closure 20 5 or disinvestment20° to sway employees to vote
against a union; they bribe susceptible organizers to keep out unions;
20 7
and they tie up bargaining for a first contract so long that they sometimes
succeed in decertifying a union.
2 0 8
200 See MAYO, supra note 34, at 120.
201 See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SuRvIVE 47-51 (1994) (discussing virulent employer
opposition to unions); BENNETT HARRISON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TuRN: COPORATE
RESTRUCTURING AND THE PoLAmzrNr, OF AMRIuC A 48-50 (1988) (discussing union avoidance strate-
gies);Jom IAwLER, UNIONIZATION AND DEUNIONiZATION 72-75, 102-08 (1990) (discussing union
avoidance as an investment decision, personnel practices to frustrate unionization, and employer
use of labor relations consultants to defeat unions); Richard B. Freeman, Why Are Unions Faring
Poorly in NLRB Representation Elections, in CHALENGES AND CHOICES FACING AMERICAN LABOR 45,
54-61 (Thomas Kochan ed., 1985).
202 See, e.g.,Johnson & Hardin Co. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 1995); NLRB v. Great Scot,
Inc., 39 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 1994); Oakwood Hosp. v. NLRB, 983 F.2d 698, 700 (6th Cir. 1993);
Leslie Homes, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 123 (1995).
203 See Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the
Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 953, 993-95 (1991) (estimating that from
1985-1989, discriminatory discharges occurred in 32% of union-representation elections).
204 Guardian Industries Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317,322 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding an NLRB
cease-and-desist order to prohibit the employer from threatening employees with unemployment
if the union was approved).
205 See, e.g., DTR Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 39 F.3d 106 (6th Cir. 1994) (denying enforcement of
an NLRB bargaining order, where the company president predicted one week before an NLRB
representation election that the firm would lose 50% of its business if employees voted for the
UAW); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v NLRB, 36 F.3d 1130, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (denying enforce-
ment of an NLRB bargaining order, where an employer predicted that can-making contracts
would be lost if employees voted for the United Steelworkers and noted that a large number of
plants represented by that union had already closed).
206 See, e.g., Adair Standish Corp. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 854, 859-60 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding
the Board's ruling that an employer violated the NLRA by making statements before a union
representation election linking delivery of a new printing press to remaining nonunion).
207 See, e.g., Robert Frank, Bottle Battle: Allegations of Bribery To Block Union Haunt Coca-Cola,
WALL ST.J., Oct. 6, 1995, atAl (reporting on the U.S. Attorney's office investigation into charges
that an executive bribed a union organizer $10,000 one week before a representation election in
exchange for getting the names of employees who were supporting the organizing drive). In the
1980s, another organizing drive failed, after which many employees were fired. Id.
208 See, e.g., NLRB v. Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1992). After two thirds of its workers
voted for union representation in 1981, the employer bargained but did not reach an agreement;
and two years later, after finally winning a remedial order from an administrative law judge, the
employer appealed. In 1990, the Board ruled on the appeal in favor of the union, but the em-
ployer appealed again. Id. at 1138. In 1992, the Seventh Circuit denied enfdrcement to the
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But frustrating union organizing appears to be beside the point when
employers change organizational form and work culture. The imperative to
use this organizational mode appears to be the same in union20 9 as well as
in nonunion settings. It is part of a management philosophy that tran-
scends the matter of union representation. Instead, its purpose is to reduce
layers of management,210 to appropriate employees' knowledge of how
work is actually performed and how it can be improved,211 and to improve
product or service quality by making employees more accountable for their
own performance.2 12 Consistent with this philosophy, teams are not organ-
ized on a mass-scale, but are deliberately kept small to encourage employee
participation.213
Moreover, just as with most teams surveyed here, teams usually do not
have general charters permitting them to set compensation,214 or other
Board's bargaining order because by this time, eleven years after election occurred, "[t]here is no
reason to believe that the union retains the support of a majority of Thill's production and main-
tenance workers. Out of the 70 to 80 members of the bargaining unit, only 10 remain from 1981."
Id. at 1142.
209 There are too many examples of companies turning to unions for cooperative solutions
through employee empowerment plans to give much credence to the idea that employee involve-
ment is used only in nonunion settings. For example, see George W. Bohlander & Marshall H.
Campbell, Problem-Solving Bargaining and Work Redesign: Magma Copper's Labor-Management Partner-
ship, NAT'L PRODucrrVT REv., Sept. 22, 1993, at 519 (reporting in detail on the radical remaking
of a confrontational union-management culture around the concept of employee empower-
ment); Richard Greer, U.S. Companies, Unions Reinventing Workplace, ATL. CONST., Sept. 6, 1993, at
Al (describing how AT&T's phone repair plant in Atlanta, which employed 485 union-repre-
sented workers in 1993, decided that it could compete with low-wage competitors in Mexico by
improving product quality and cutting waste); Tim Shorrock, Business Groups Want Curbs Lifted on
Nonunion Committees, Das MOINEs REc.,Jan. 23, 1995, at 16 (reporting on the Amalgamated Cloth-
ing and Textile Workers relationship with Xerox Corp. that resulted in ideas that significantly
reduced production costs); Guy Webster, Mining: A Giant Bore ARiz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1993, at 1
(reporting that the team concept was at the heart of a labor agreement that saved 1,300 mining
jobs).
210 See Homa Bahrami, The EmergingFlexible Organization, 34 CAL. McMT. REv. 33 (1992); Elli-
ottJaques, We Don't Need Flat Organizations, 68 H.Av. Bus. REv. 127 (1990).
211 See Howard Gleckman et al., The Technology Payoff. A Sweeping Reorganization of Work Itself Is
Boosting Productivity, Bus. WEEKJune 14, 1993, at 57, 57 (statement of Gary Reiner, GE vice presi-
dent for business development) (identifying work redesign as his company's solution to produc-
tivity problems, and particularly credited the practice of giving workers more flexibility and
authority to accomplish their work: "All the good ideas-all of them-come from the hourly
workers."). He credited their input with cutting inventory costs at GE Power Systems from $90-
$100 million a year. Id.
212 See, e.g., Tim McLaughlin, Total Quality Management: The Wind Beneath McDonnell F/A-18's
Wings, ST. Louis Bus.J., Oct. 2, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 10490343 (describing how
employee teams working on the Navy's F/A-18 Super Hornet have reduced the plane's weight by
1,000 pounds, reduced parts by 33%, improved wing function and engine thrust, and weeded out
unreliable suppliers); Robert L. Rose, Hard Driving: A Productivity Push at Wabash Puts Firm on a
Roll, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1995, at Al (describing a nonunion firm with a hierarchical manage-
ment system that nevertheless uses employee participation to identify improvements in manufac-
turing efficiency).
213 See Miles & Snow, supra note 37, at 11 (reporting that "[p]erhaps the most well-developed
large-company spherical network is that operated by electrical equipment manufacturer ABB
(Asea Brown Boveri). Although ABB has over 200,000 employees, all work in small organizational
units. The average plant employs fewer than 200 workers, and most of the company's 5,000 profit
centers contain only 40 to 50 people.").
214 Peter V. LeBlanc, Pay For Work: Reviving An Old Idea For the New Customer Focus, COMP.NSA-
TION & BENEFITS REv.,July 1, 1994 at 5, 12 (concluding that "organizations apparently believe that
they can give employees more responsibilities, reduce management levels and numbers, and raise




conditions of employment. Instead, they usually have a narrowly defined
function and often exclusive domain, such as workplace safety. Often, their
focus is directed at saving production or service costs,2 1 5 or improving cus-
tomer satisfaction.2 16
This is not to suggest that increased employee participation in nonun-
ion settings poses no problems for unions. Teamwork's greatest threat to
unions is the promise of employee empowerment, because effecting that
promise might undercut the paradigm of employee-employer conflict that
is at the heart of every union's appeal.
But even though the findings presented here show that employee
teams today are nothing like company unions in the 1930s, and although
this Article finds that the TEAM Act does nothing more than codify Electro-
mation and DuPont's guidance language, these findings and conclusions do
not imply that empowerment will succeed. Nor do they imply the kind of
threat to unions that critics suggest.
First, history is not on the employers' side. Reading the vast literature
on current employee participation plans, one gets the sense that employers
believe they have found a New Age method for managing human re-
sources. Perhaps the best scholarship in this whole field is historical, show-
ing that numerous employers a century ago experimented with the very
organizational forms and methods reported here.2 1 7 We do not know why
this early experimentation lapsed into dormancy for sixty years; but these
programs did not fail for lack of scientific ingenuity, or employer
commitment.
Second, just as a union eventually was certified to represent employees
at Electromation, 218 union organizing is taking place notwithstanding the
215 See William G. Clemens, Strike Threat Helped Forge Successful Labor Policy, TUCSON CTZEN,
Aug. 7, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 8972024; William G. Clemens, Magma A Shining
Example, TuCSON CrrzEN, Aug. 7, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 8972023 (describing in
detail how employee involvement teams helped to sharply reduce copper production costs in a
highly competitive industry from 78 cents a pound in 1988 to 58 cents a pound in 1994); Emily
Nelson, Gas Company s Gain-Sharing Plan Turns Employees Into Cost-Cutting VWgilantes, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 29, 1995, at BI (describing how a struggling gas utility has regained a competitive edge by
empowering workers to make business decisions that reduce operating expenses).
216 For a general observation, see RahulJacob, The Struggle To Create An Organizationfor the 21st
Century, FORTUNE, Apr. 3, 1995, at 90 (stating that "[r]ather than focusing single-mindedly on
financial objectives or functional goals, the horizontal organization emphasizes customer satisfac-
tion."). See also Peter V. LeBlanc, Pay For Work: Reviving An Old Idea For the New Customer Focus,
COMPENSATION & BEEFITS REv., July 1, 1994 at 5, 8 (reporting this particular example of organi-
zations being more customer-focused: "In April 1994, Boeing unveiled its first new commercial
aircraft in more than a decade to compete with Europe's Airbus and other jumbo passenger
airplanes. Unlike in the past, Boeing invited customers to help company teams design the plane.
This critical customer input resulted in a more easily maintained plane (flight attendants can
change bulbs in overhead reading lights, for example) with wider aisles, bigger storage bins, and
higher ceilings for greater comfort.").
217 For an especially incisive history, see Sanford M. Jacoby, Union-Management Cooperation in
the United States: Lessons from the 1920s, 37 INDus. & LAB. REL. Rxv. 18 (1983). After making an
exhaustive comparison of employee involvement efforts in the 1920s and 1980s, Jacoby con-
cluded: "Today, ideas about union-management cooperation that have long been dormant again
are in the air. It is risky to draw lessons from the past as a guide to future developments; neverthe-
less, there are striking similarities between earlier and current experiments in union-manage-
ment cooperation." Id. at 31.
218 Albert R. Karr, Labor Letter, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1994, at Al.
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introduction of empowerment work settings.219 Empowerment may create
expectations that cannot be fulfilled, or it may challenge employees too
much. It is also possible that unions have been successful in organizing for
reasons unrelated to empowerment in specific work settings.
Third, there are gathering storm clouds on the nation's economic ho-
rizon, centering on income distribution; and these developments have im-
plications for union organizing regardless of worker empowerment.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, American workers improved their pro-
ductivity,22 0 while declines in unit costs in this period greatly improved their
employers' global competitiveness.2 21 By 1994, productivity gains and slow
wage growth put American employers in a commanding lead against top-
rivals, Germany and Japan;222 and this combination contributed to record
profits posted by American corporations.
2 23
Workers have not shared, however, in these gains. Inflation-adjusted
wages in the U.S. have actually fallen since 1973.224 This has resulted in a
growing disparity between poor and wealthy Americans; and the growing
gap has become so alarming that an unusual array of economists, 22 5 busi-
ness leaders, 226 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, 227 and other
219 See Bill Bowen, Public Workers' Union Makes Dallas Inroads, Dallas Bus. J., Oct. 1, 1993, avail-
able in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 9418712 (reporting that: "[S]purred by such practices as team man-
agement and employee involvement, there are signs that labor organizing among public sector
employees may be coming to life-even in Texas."). The article noted that the American Federa-
tion of State, County, and Municipal Employees union succeeded in organizing 2,500 employees
in the two preceding years. Id.
220 For a recent study on manufacturing productivity, see Mary Grenier et al., Comparative
ManufacturingProductivity and Unit Labor Costs, 118 MONTHLY LAa. REv. 26 (1995). U.S. productiv-
ity growth from 1979-1993 averaged 2.5% a year, placing the nation behindJapan, Belgium, Italy,
and the U.K. American productivity was better during 1985-1990 (2.8% growth per year), and
grew to 3.2% in 1993. Id. at 29.
221 Alfred L. Malabre, Jr., Protectionist Calls Belie Competitiveness, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 27, 1992, atAl
(showing that unit labor costs in the U.S. fell 0.1% from 1985-1990, but rose 7.9% in Canada,
10.3% inJapan, 10.8% in Britain, 11.0% in France, 11.3% in South Korea, 14.3% in Italy, and
15.6% in Germany).
222 See David Wessel, The U.S. Eonomy May Dominate for Years, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1994, at Al,
observing:
Like a once-flabby athlete, the U.S. has been working out at the health club for the past
couple of years. And it has paid off. Germany and Japan have just finished a big lunch
and are only now signing up at the local gym....
Morgan Stanley figures U.S. workers cost $16.70 an hour at current exchange rates;
Japanese labor costs $19.30, and Germany $25.50. The gap will narrow, but the U.S.
advantage is likely to persist.
223 Roger Lowenstein, The '20% Club' No Longer Is Exclusive; WALL ST. J., May 4, 1995, at CI
(r6porfing that first quarter 1995 return-on-equity for Standard & Poor's 500 companies averaged
20.12%). Lowenstein reported that "[t]his figure... represents the highest level of corporate
profitability in the postwar era.... ." Id.
224 See Melvin M. Brodsky, Labor Market Flexibility: A Changing International Perspective, MONTHLY
LAB. Rrv., Nov. 1994, at 53, 58 (reporting that "[r]eal hourly earnings of production or nonsuper-
visory workers on private nonfarm payrolls, which peaked in 1973 at $8.55 per hour and have
been headed downward since, were $7.64 in 1989 and $7.39 in 1993.").
225 See Keith Bradsher, Rich GettingRicher in U.S., Studies Find, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 17, 1995, at Al
(reporting Prof. Edward N. Wolff s comparative study on income distributions in industrialized
nations and the economist's conclusion that "[w]e are the most unequal industrialized country in
terms of income and wealth, and we're growing more unequal faster than the other industrial-
ized nations.").
226 See Steven Rattner, U.S. Income Is Getting Riskier, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 2, 1995, at lIB
(statement of Steven Rattner, managing partner of Lazard Freres & Co.) (observing that "since
1973, annual earnings of the bottom 10 percent of workers have dropped by 24 percent-after
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policy-makers228 have expressed deep concern about it. In sum, unless em-
ployers share more productivity gains from teamwork with employees in
the form of improved pay and job security, they appear to increase the risk
that employees will withdraw from, or withhold themselves from, participa-
tive programs. Moreover, since worker perceptions of inadequate pay often
spur union organizing,229 nonunion employers should be concerned about
inequitable team programs.
Fourth, it may be too early to discern the effects of large-scale reduc-
tions among managerial employees that often attend empowerment pro-
grams. To date, teamwork's biggest loser has not been production workers,
but managers,230 as firms have slashed their jobs while pushing decision-
making down the organization to more self-directed work teams. This has
resulted in increased insecurity among a class of employees who never
before felt this threatened. Moreover, it is conceivable that the beneficial
effects of disemploying managers show up early, while harmful effects, such
as loss of valuable experience, are delayed.
231
adjustment for inflation-while those of the top 20 percent have increased by 10 percent. As a
result, the United States... has the widest income disparity of any modem democratic nation.").
227 David Wessel, Greenspan Predicts Revival of Growth Without Any Acceleration in Inflation, WALL
ST.J.,July 20, 1995, atA2 (reporting that Greenspan testified that the increasingly unequal distri-
bution in the U.S. posed "a major threat to our society."). On Jan. 25, 1995, in testimony before
the Senate Finance committee, Greenspan testified that "most all analysts of income distributions
have been acutely aware that since the late 1970s, that there's been a fairly pronounced increas-
ing dispersion of incomes, and that... the rich get richer and the poor get poorer." Hearing of the
Senate Finance Committee Subject: Economic Outlook, FED. NEms SERV. WASH. PACKAGE (Jan. 25, 1995),
available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 6623933.
228 See Prepared Testimony of Robert E. Rubin Secretary of the Treasury Before the House Appropriations
Committee, FED. NEws Saav.-WASH. PACKAGE (Feb. 14, 1995), available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL
6621829 (statement of Secretary of Treasury, Robert Rubin):
This slow growth in average wages has been accompanied by an unequal distribution of
income gains.... [I]n the past fifteen years, those with incomes in the lowest fifth of
American households have seen their real incomes fall below the levels attained by their
counterparts in 1980; those in the top fifth have seen their incomes rise by 21 percent;
and the middle has stood still.
The unequal distribution of income gains over the past fifteen years has put very
real pressure on middle-class families. Their standards of living have failed to match
their legitimate expectations.
See also Remarks by Labor Secretary Robert Reich At Labor Department Low-Wage Workers Conference
Labor Department, FED. NEws SEav. WASH. PACKAGE (Feb. 16, 1995), available in WESTLAW, 1995
WL 6621937 (statement of Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich) ("[i]n the late 1970s, about 7 1/2
percent of working families ... were below the poverty line .... Right now, 1995, 11.5 percent of
working American families are under the poverty line .... [T]he problem is not that some
people are getting rich.... It's good news that some people are getting rich. The problem is that
most of us are getting nowhere. We're hurtling toward a two-tiered society composed of a minor-
ity who are profiting from economic growth and a majority who are not.").
229 See, e.g., David Debo, Union Starts Organizing Drive at Fisher-Price's Medina Plant, Bus. Fipsr-
BurA.o,Jan. 9, 1995, at 3 (reporting on a union organizing drive sparked at a long-time nonun-
ion toy factory after the employer eliminated extra weekend pay); Peter L. DeCoursey, Support
Employees at Boone Go Union, READING EAGLE, Sept. 29, 1995, at B2 (reporting that a school dis-
trict's support and clerical staff voted for union representation over unhappiness with a 2% an-
nual raise); Linda Tucci, McDonnell Douglas Machinists See Union For Engineers, ST. Louis Bus. J.,
July 4, 1994, at 1 (reporting on a union organizing drive involving 10,000 professional employees
after the employer's over-perceived, arbitrary pay cuts).
230 See Tomasko, supra note 6, at 10 (reporting Drucker's observation).
231 Id. (reporting Harry Levinson's insights on corporate reeingineering: "Early retirements
have left many [employers] bereft of organizational memory.").
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Finally,just as there is some evidence that increased empowerment has
threatened the managerial class, it also appears that aspects of teamwork
have occasionally alienated or angered nonsupervisory employees.2 32 The
team concept has not existed in a strategic vacuum, but rather, has been
part of employers' plan to respond to global competition; 233 and as part of
this strategy, employers have been laying off employees even when the firm
has been profitable.2 34 Workers have reacted to this strategy with anxiety,
fear and a sense of betrayal.2 35 Disemploying people through layoffs and
coerced retirements has created a grim survivors' syndrome in some work-
places.2 36 A senior industrial psychologist at AT&T recently offered this
evaluation on the effects of corporate delayering, and consequent job-cut-
ting, to senior executives: "Open hostility is surfacing as never before. Its
focus is toward the company rather than toward the competition or the
marketplace where such energies can be productively channeled. The
amount of suppressed, covert hostility lurking just below the surface in
many people is truly frightening."
2 37
Against this backdrop of constant restructuring, some empowerment
programs have cut muscle, and not just fat, out of organizations.23 8 Some
teams have been constantly pushed to improve efficiency to the point
232 For an excellent article on "mavericks," employees who fail to be won-over by teams, and
who often work to undermine team effectiveness, see Lynn Summers & Ben Rosen, Mavericks Ride
Again (Troublesome Work Team Members), TRAINING & DEVELOPMENT, May 1, 1994, at 119. According
to one team member "Mavericks are team members who aren't 'with the program.'... They do
what they think are their jobs, but they don't crosstrain or help anyone. They care only about
themselves, not about the team. And they aggravate other team members." Id.
233 See supra notes 4 and 8.
234 Matt Murray, Thanks, Goodbye: Amid Record Profits, Companies Continue to Lay Off Employees,
WALL ST.J., May 4, 1995, at Al. Murray reports that as corporate profits increased 13% in 1993
and 11% in 1994, companies laid off 516,069 employees. This figure exceeded by 200,000 the
number of jobs that were cut during 1990, when the last recession occurred. Id. Proctor &
Gamble Chairman Edwin Artzt explained why his company slashed 13,000 of its 106,000 jobs
recently. "We must slim down to stay competitive .... The public has come to think of corporate
restructuring as a sign of trouble, but this is definitely not our situation." Id.
235 Xerox, which was represented by its CEO on the Dunlop Commission and has a successful
team approach, eliminated 9,500 of its 97,000 jobs since the beginning of 1994. Id. A company
spokesman related that "Xerox has had a very paternalistic reputation for its sort-of contract with
employees for years.... I know it can sound very heartless when you're making these decisions
when individuals' careers are affected, especially when the company's making money. But I think
it is a new reality." Id. Employee Bennie Dillon commented: "Three to five years ago, I felt pretty
close to being comfortable, but now I think I'm part of a big wheel that's just rolling. Whatever
that wheel wants to do, it's going to do it." Id. AT&T, another company using employee involve-
ment teams, cut 9,800jobs in 1994, when it also posted its best financial results in a decade. Id. at
A6. An AT&T technician, Joe Froman, reacted:
I always get a chuckle when they go on TV and say we're doing so well. Here at the
bottom ranks, where the grunts are, you're always feeling the pinch, the tightening of
the belt, take this away, take that away. You always wonder why they couldn't make
things better for us when they're doing so well.
Id.
236 See ANTHoNY DowNs, CORPORATE EXECUTIONS (1995).
237 Peter Larson, Layoff Survivors Require Care, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 11, 1995, at E16.
238 For an intriguing view of this, see Carol Howes, Cult of "Corporate Anorexia" Could Tip Com-
panies Over Edge, OTTAWA CmzEN, May 20, 1995, at D9. Bob Evans, founder of a Canadian out-
placement firm, compares delayered and empowered firms to anorexics who lack muscle and fat
to handle emergencies and other shocks. He opines that empowerment is sometimes a euphe-
mism that means "employees take on more and more and more." Id. Eventually, he says, workers




where some employees have felt that the pace of work has gotten out of
hand.23 9 Team-workers have felt betrayed when their employer has out-
sourced their jobs to low-wage workers in developing countries.24° Other
team-workers have felt that labor-management cooperation is simply a one-
way street benefitting their employer.241 In union-represented workplaces,
this perception has destabilized union leadership supporting cooperative
labor relations, and spawned dissident organization within unions.
242
239 See Erik Gunn, Union at Briggs Moves to Recast Acrimonious Debate over Job Losses, MILWAUKEE
J., June 6, 1994, at 8C (reflecting this concern in a labor dispute involving thousands of workers
for engine-maker Briggs-Stratton, where a local union leader was fearful about self-directed work
teams being used in a speedup, thereby creating more stress for production workers); see also
Robert L. Rose, Hard Driving. A Productivity Push at Wabash National Puts Firm on a Roll, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 7, 1995, atAl (reporting on disgruntled manufacturing employees working in an empow-
ered environment, who are interested in forming a union to address onerous working conditions,
such as assembly speed-ups and working in extremely hot factories).
240 See Sean Griffin, Job Insecurity: Angry, Anxious Boeing Machinists Know That If a New Contract
Isn't To Their Liking, They Can Walk Off theJob, TACOMA NEWs TRaB., Sept. 24, 1995, at G1. Job
outsourcing was at the heart of a major machinist strike against Boeing in October 1995. Griffin
reports that the purpose of union cooperation over the past three years was "to make the com-
pany leaner, smarter, more productive and less divided by bureaucratic barriers." Id. Neverthe-
less, Boeing decided to "off-load" some jobs to Mexican employees, whose earnings are only one-
fourth of similar Boeing employees. The article reports that "Boeing officials were surprised at
the angry reaction to their announcement three months ago that another 4 percent of Boeing
work would be exported. Workers shouted down bosses. They stomped out of meetings. They felt
a bitter sense of betrayal." Id.
241 Two bitter strikes at Caterpillar in the 1990s provide an illustration, because these strikes
occurred in the context of a strong labor-management cooperation program. Frank Swoboda,
The Bitter Harvest of a Global Shift: Improving Productivity Doesn't Help Caterpillar Workers in an Interna-
tionalized Economy, WASH. Posr, Apr. 19, 1992, at H1, insightfully reports:
In the new world order of global competition, the bitter five-month strike at Caterpillar
Inc. above all raises questions about how the fruits of labor-management cooperation
should be divided up.
What share of the rewards should go to the company's shareholders, who provided
the cash to modernize and automate, and what share belongs to the workers, whose
cooperation on the factory floor helped raise productivity to a worldwide standard?
See also Robert L. Rose & Alex Kotowitz, Back to Bickering Strife Between UAWand Caterpillar Blights
Promising Labor Idea, WALt. ST.J., Nov. 23, 1992, atAl (reporting on particular aspects of Caterpil-
lar's employee-involvement program that were greatly damaged by the UAW strike: "Employee
involvement became a near-religion in industrial America during the 1980s as Rust Belt compa-
nies sought to become competitive in world markets. But with so many workers now worried
about losing their jobs, 'these programs are under siege,' says Tom Raleigh, a consultant who
helped initiate Caterpillar's [program].").
242 See Robert R. Rehder, Japanese Transplants: After the Honeymoon, Bus. HoiuZONS, Jan.Feb.
1990, at 87 (reporting on the New Directions dissident movement in the United Auto Workers).
This group "is calling for less cooperation with companies that they allege are forcing workers to
compete with each other under a primarily Japanese management system." Id. at 88; see also
James Risen, Dissidents'Win at Marda Plant Stuns UAW, Firm, LA. TMES, May 11, 1989, at 1. Risen
reports on the surprising election of a more confrontational union leadership representing
thousands of auto workers in a plant where employee involvement was built around the concept
of kaizen (aJapanese term for continuous improvement through increased productivity and qual-
ity). The article reports that workers began to identify kaizen with production line speed-ups,
heavier workloads, and improvements that made their jobs obsolete. The defeated local union
president observed that:
People don't feel they have had the input in decision-making that they were told they
would have. Management thinks that employee involvement means that managers listen
to what the workers say, and then go ahead and make the decisions themselves. The
people were told in orientation that it meant they would be involved in the actual deci-
sion-making.
1996)
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The debate so far about the TEAM Act has been steeped in well-re-
hearsed arguments by familiar employer and union representatives, with
some disgruntled professors joining in from the sidelines. This Article im-
proves on this debate by surveying twenty-three participative teams to see
how well they comply with Electromation and DuPont. It also makes two un-
remarkable, and yet little remarked, observations: that the TEAM Act does
not portend the return of company unions, nor does it change Electromation
and DuPont. Essentially, the act offers to codify the common-sense gui-
dance that these decisions provided, while demonstrating Republican
prowess in legislating against labor's will.
As important as this legislation is, it does not address a more funda-
mental matter. A century ago, some employers experimented with organi-
zational models for sharing power between themselves and small groups of
employees, but that experiment failed for reasons having nothing to do
with NLRB decisions. By the 1930s, virtually all employers returned to orga-
nizational models based on adversarial conceptions of workers and man-
agement, including company unions. In light of this history, even if the




SURVEY OF EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT GROUPS & WORK TEAMS
Please use a SEPARATE FORM to answer questions about EACH em-
ployee involvement or team-based group you know. Some questions ask
how a group operates. Please consider your answers carefully. Your an-
swers are anonymous. By using the enclosed self-addressed envelope, your
survey will go to the University of Illinois Mail Center. The mail clerk will
open and discard envelopes before forwarding surveys to me to ensure that
I don't use a postmark to identify you.
I. BACKGROUND
I(1) Name of Group:
1(2) Type of Group:
Employee Involvement Program ( )
Work Team ( )
Quality-of-Work Life ( )
Employee Committee ( )
Other ( )
1(3) Number of Employees Covered:
1(4) Brief Description of Work Performed by Employees:
II. CREATION OF GROUP
11(1) How many years has the group been in existence?
11(2) Who created the group?
Management ( )
Employees ( )
Management and employees ( )
11(3) Were written goals for the group issued at the time it was created?
Yes ( ) No ( ) Cannot Determine ( )
11(4) Briefly summarize these goals:
11(5) Have these formal goals ever been changed since the group began?
Yes ( ) No ( ) Cannot Determine ( )
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
III. STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF GROUP
MI(l) Describe how employee participation occurs. Check more than one if
applicable:
Employees are selected ( )
Employees volunteer ( )
Employees participate as part of their job ( )
Employees are elected by peers ( )
Employees are appointed by ( )
management
MI(2) Describe how management participation occurs. Check more than one
if applicable:
Managers volunteer ( )
Managers are specifically assigned ( )
Managers participate as part of their job ( )
Managers are appointed ( )
Managers are selected by employees ( )
There are no managers ( )
1H(3) Length of Employee Participation
Employees participate for a fixed, ( )
definite term
Employees participate indefinitely ( )
11(4) How is the group's work determined? Check more than one if
applicable:
Management directive ( )
Management-employee consensus (
Employee initiative ( )
Other (List) ( )
IV. GROUP'S DECISION MAKING POWERS
IV(l) Describe how the group makes decisions.
applicable:
The group only discusses and makes no
decisions
The group makes suggestions
The group makes proposals that
management considers
The group makes decisions based on
voting by group members









IV(2) For groups having decision making powers, describe how agreement is
reached:
IV(3) For groups having decision-making powers, describe how disagreements
are handled:
V. SUBJECTS HANDLED BY GROUPS






















VI. EFFEcrs OF GROUP AcTmTy
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VII. EVALUATION OF GROUP AcTIry
VII(l) How often is the group formally evaluated?
Never
Irregular times (
Once a year (
More than once a year ( )
V1I(2) If the group is evaluated, who evaluates? Check more than one, if
applicable.
Only managers
Only employees ( )
Managers and employees ( )
External reviewers
(Nonmembers of the group)
VII(3) If the group is evaluated, what is evaluated? Check more than one, if
applicable.
Effect of group activity on business objectives
Scope of group's activity (
Group's communication dynamics (
Group's decision making dynamics (
Relationship of group to other business units
Attitudes of group members ( )
End-user (e.g., customer) perception of group ( )
VIII. INTER-GRouP AcTivTy AND COORDINATION
VIII(1) Does the group formally interact with other groups?
Yes( )No( )
VIII(2) If yes, what are these groups? Check more than one, if applicable.
Other employee group (
(Name)
End-user (customer) group ( )
(Name)
Other ( )
Thank you for your time and effort in completing this survey. Copies of
aggregate results are available from Professor Michael H. LeRoy, Institute
of Labor & Industrial Relations, 504 E. Armory, Champaign, IL 61820
((217) 333-1482).
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